# Dark Mountain Affirmative

I decided to write a K aff because I had never written one before. We only read this at the Battle for LA to try it out and never read it again. The aff file is pretty minimal and doesn’t have a lot of frontlines in it for this reason.

I got the idea while writing a different kritik. The poetry, most of the cards, and the names of each of the parts came from this: <http://dark-mountain.net/about/manifesto/>

Shoutout to Jackson for his sick counter-poem: “Roses are red/Violets are blue/Resource extraction is good for you”

## The Dark Mountain---1AC

### Walking on Lava

#### PART ONE IS WALKING ON LAVA –

#### Our planet is dying as we speak – yet we deny that we live in an age of ecocide, guaranteeing its continuing destruction

The Dark Mountain 9 [(network of writers, artists and thinkers, includes David Abram, ecologist and geophilosopher, published in numerous scholarly journals; Charlotte Du Cann, writer, editor and community activist, Editor-in-Chief of Transition Free Press; Paul Kingsnorth, deputy-editor of The Ecologist, environmentalist and poet who writes for publications worldwide. “UNCIVILISATION: THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO” The Dark Mountain Project]

The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the other. Both tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval swamps, as a humble part of something called ‘nature’, which we have now triumphantly subdued. The very fact that we have a word for ‘nature’ is [5] evidence that we do not regard ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our civilisation. We are, we tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won. In this, our unique glory is contained. Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent. We are the first generations to grow up surrounded by evidence that our attempt to separate ourselves from ‘nature’ has been a grim failure, proof not of our genius but our hubris. The attempt to sever the hand from the body has endangered the ‘progress’ we hold so dear, and it has endangered much of ‘nature’ too. The resulting upheaval underlies the crisis we now face. We imagined ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from this imaginative error is all around us: a quarter of the world’s mammals are threatened with imminent extinction; an acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second; 75% of the world’s fish stocks are on the verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more of the world’s natural ‘products’ than the Earth can replace — a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us. And over it all looms runaway climate change. Climate change, which threatens to render all human projects irrelevant; which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of understanding of the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are still entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful colour the head-on crash between civilisation and ‘nature’; which makes plain, more effectively than any carefully constructed argument or optimistically defiant protest, how the machine’s need for permanent growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, which brings home at last our ultimate powerlessness. These are the facts, or some of them. Yet facts never tell the whole story. (‘Facts’, Conrad wrote, in Lord Jim, ‘as if facts could prove anything.’) The facts of environmental crisis we hear so much about often conceal as much as they expose. We hear daily about the impacts of our activities on ‘the environment’ (like ‘nature’, this is an expression which distances us from the reality of our situation). Daily we hear, too, of the many ‘solutions’ to these problems: solutions which usually involve the necessity of urgent political agreement and a judicious application of human technological genius. Things may be changing, runs the narrative, but there is nothing we cannot deal with here, folks. We perhaps need to move faster, more urgently. Certainly we need to accelerate the pace of research and development. We accept that we must become more ‘sustainable’. But everything will be fine. There will still be growth, there will still be progress: these things will continue, because they have to continue, so they cannot do anything but continue. There is nothing to see here. Everything will be fine. We do not believe that everything will be fine. We are not even sure, based on current definitions of progress and improvement, that we want it to be. Of all humanity’s delusions of difference, of its separation from and superiority to the living world which surrounds it, one distinction holds up better than most: we may well be the first species capable of effectively eliminating life on Earth. This is a hypothesis we seem intent on putting to the test. We are already responsible for denuding the world of much of its richness, magnificence, beauty, colour and magic, and we show no sign of slowing down. For a very long time, we imagined that ‘nature’ was something that happened elsewhere. The damage we did to it might be regrettable, but needed to be weighed against the benefits here and now. And in the worst case scenario, there would always be some kind of Plan B. Perhaps we would make for the moon, where we could survive in lunar colonies under giant bubbles as we planned our expansion across the galaxy. But there is no Plan B and the bubble, it turns out, is where we have been living all the while. The bubble is that delusion of isolation under which we have laboured for so long. The bubble has cut us off from life on the only planet we have, or are ever likely to have. The bubble is civilisation. Consider the structures on which that bubble has been built. Its foundations are geological: coal, oil, gas — millions upon millions of years of ancient sunlight, dragged from the depths of the planet and burned with abandon. On this base, the structure stands. Move upwards, and you pass through a jumble of supporting horrors: battery chicken sheds; industrial abattoirs; burning forests; beam-trawled ocean floors; dynamited reefs; hollowed-out mountains; wasted soil. Finally, on top of all these unseen layers, you reach the well-tended surface where you and I stand: unaware, or uninterested, in what goes on beneath us; demanding that the authorities keep us in the manner to which we have been accustomed; occasion- ally feeling twinges of guilt that lead us to buy organic chickens or locally-produced lettuces; yet for the most part glutted, but not sated, on the fruits of the horrors on which our lifestyles depend. We are the first generations born into a new and unprecedented age — the age of ecocide. To name it thus is not to presume the outcome, but simply to describe a process which is underway. The ground, the sea, the air, the elemental backdrops to our existence — all these our economics has taken for granted, to be used as a bottomless tip, endlessly able to dilute and disperse the tailings of our extraction, production, consumption. The sheer scale of the sky or the weight of a swollen river makes it hard to imagine that creatures as flimsy as you and I could do that much damage. Philip Larkin gave voice to this attitude, and the creeping, worrying end of it in his poem Going, Going: Nearly forty years on from Larkin’s words, doubt is what all of us seem to feel, all of the time. Too much filth has been chucked in the sea and into the soil and into the atmosphere to make any other feeling sensible. The doubt, and the facts, have paved the way for a worldwide movement of environmental politics, which aimed, at least in its early, raw form, to challenge the myths of development and progress head-on. But time has not been kind to the greens. Today’s environmentalists are more likely to be found at corporate conferences hymning the virtues of ‘sustainability’ and ‘ethical consumption’ than doing anything as naive as questioning the intrinsic values of civilisation. Capitalism has absorbed the greens, as it absorbs so many challenges to its ascendancy. A radical challenge to the human machine has been transformed into yet another opportunity for shopping. ‘Denial’ is a hot word, heavy with connotations. When it is used to brand the remaining rump of climate change sceptics, they object noisily to the association with those who would rewrite the history of the Holocaust. Yet the focus on this dwindling group may serve as a distraction from a far larger form of denial, in its psychoanalytic sense. Freud wrote of the inability of people to hear things which did not fit with the way they saw themselves and the world. We put ourselves through all kinds of inner contortions, rather than look plainly at those things which challenge our fundamental understanding of the world. Today, humanity is up to its neck in denial about what it has built, what it has become — and what it is in for. Ecological and economic collapse unfold before us and, if we acknowledge them at all, we act as if this were a temporary problem, a technical glitch. Centuries of hubris block our ears like wax plugs; we cannot hear the message which reality is screaming at us. For all our doubts and discontents, we are still wired to an idea of history in which the future will be an upgraded version of the present. The assumption remains that things must continue in their current direction: the sense of crisis only smudges the meaning of that ‘must’. No longer a natural inevitability, it becomes an urgent necessity: we must find a way to go on having supermarkets and superhighways. We cannot contemplate the alternative. And so we find ourselves, all of us together, poised trembling on the edge of a change so massive that we have no way of gauging it. None of us knows where to look, but all of us know not to look down. Secretly, we all think we are doomed: even the politicians think this; even the environmentalists. Some of us deal with it by going shopping. Some deal with it by hoping it is true. Some give up in despair. Some work frantically to try and fend off the coming storm. Our question is: what would happen if we looked down? Would it be as bad as we imagine? What might we see? Could it even be good for us? We believe it is time to look down.

#### In our modern civilization, our privileging of the supremely rational logos has made us forget that the myths that still rule our lives are just myths. We need a new story that reframes our mastery over nature, one that allows us to live in nature rather than living over it

The Dark Mountain 2 [(network of writers, artists and thinkers, includes David Abram, ecologist and geophilosopher, published in numerous scholarly journals; Charlotte Du Cann, writer, editor and community activist, Editor-in-Chief of Transition Free Press; Paul Kingsnorth, deputy-editor of The Ecologist, environmentalist and poet who writes for publications worldwide. “UNCIVILISATION: THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO” The Dark Mountain Project]

If we are indeed teetering on the edge of a massive change in how we live, in how human society itself is constructed, and in how we relate to the rest of the world, then we were led to this point by the stories we have told ourselves — above all, by the story of civilisation. This story has many variants, religious and secular, scientific, economic and mystic. But all tell of humanity’s original transcendence of its animal beginnings, our growing mastery over a ‘nature’ to which we no longer belong, and the glorious future of plenty and prosperity which will follow when this mastery is complete. It is the story of human centrality, of a species destined to be lord of all it surveys, unconfined by the limits that apply to other, lesser creatures. What makes this story so dangerous is that, for the most part, we have forgotten that it is a story. It has been told so many times by those who see themselves as rationalists, even scientists; heirs to the Enlightenment’s legacy — a legacy which includes the denial of the role of stories in making the world. Humans have always lived by stories, and those with skill in telling them have been treated with respect and, often, a certain wariness. Beyond the limits of reason, reality remains mysterious, as incapable of being approached directly as a hunter’s quarry. With stories, with art, with symbols and layers of meaning, we stalk those elusive aspects of reality that go undreamed of in our philosophy. The storyteller weaves the mysterious into the fabric of life, lacing it with the comic, the tragic, the obscene, making safe paths through dangerous territory. Yet as the myth of civilisation deepened its grip on our thinking, borrowing the guise of science and reason, we began to deny the role of stories, to dismiss their power as something primitive, childish, outgrown. The old tales by which generations had made sense of life’s subtleties and strangenesses were bowdlerised and packed off to the nursery. Religion, that bag of myths and mysteries, birthplace of the theatre, was straightened out into a framework of universal laws and moral account-keeping. The dream visions of the Middle Ages became the nonsense stories of Victorian childhood. In the age of the novel, stories were no longer the way to approach the deep truths of the world, so much as a way to pass time on a train journey. It is hard, today, to imagine that the word of a poet was once feared by a king. Yet for all this, our world is still shaped by stories. Through television, film, novels and video games, we may be more thoroughly bombarded with narrative material than any people that ever lived. What is peculiar, however, is the carelessness with which these stories are channelled at us — as entertainment, a distraction from daily life, something to hold our attention to the other side of the ad break. There is little sense that these things make up the equipment by which we navigate reality. On the other hand, there are the serious stories told by economists, politicians, geneticists and corporate leaders. These are not presented as stories at all, but as direct accounts of how the world is. Choose between competing versions, then fight with those who chose differently. The ensuing conflicts play out on early morning radio, in afternoon debates and late night television pundit wars. And yet, for all the noise, what is striking is how much the opposing sides agree on: all their stories are only variants of the larger story of human centrality, of our ever-expanding control over ‘nature’, our right to perpetual economic growth, our ability to transcend all limits. So we find ourselves, our ways of telling unbalanced, trapped inside a runaway narrative, headed for the worst kind of encounter with reality. In such a moment, writers, artists, poets and storytellers of all kinds have a critical role to play. Creativity remains the most uncontrollable of human forces: without it, the project of civilisation is inconceivable, yet no part of life remains so untamed and undomesticated. Words and images can change minds, hearts, even the course of history. Their makers shape the stories people carry through their lives, unearth old ones and breathe them back to life, add new twists, point to unexpected endings. It is time to pick up the threads and make the stories new, as they must always be made new, starting from where we are.

#### A shift to mythos is crucial – a logocentric narrative of absolute truth in interpretation justifies violence against all those who disagree

Klaus Krippendorff 90 - Professor of Communication at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania (“Models and Metaphors of Communication” 1990 Departmental Papers (ASC) http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1283&context=asc\_papers)

Let me start with communication is sharing. I am suggesting that this commonly cherished metaphor is a wolf in sheeps clothing. Considered as the foundation of intimacy, friendship, community, and social organization, communication is sharing 22 invites, nourishes, and can hence not be separated from instituting an authority, an authority that is constitutively oppressive. As presented earlier, when messages are containers of entities that have an objective existence and belong to a single observer independent reality, contents of communication must therefore be the same for whoever puts them in and whoever takes them out and all those receiving the same message must also get the same content. Because sharing is so highly valued in society, the experience of disagreements or mismatches between intentions and receptions or among different interpretations of the same message often is upsetting. When such discrepancies are apparent, it turns out, we do not dismiss the sharing metaphor, rather, we find either the process of communication unreliable or the communicators incompetent, devious, or in error. I am suggesting that blaming the communicators evokes three normal responses, all of them basically inhumane. Firstly, differences may be dismissed as errors, pathological, devious misconduct or mere entertainment. We dismiss them as errors when we can trace differences to inabilities, accidents or involuntary happenings. We dismiss them as pathological when we can explain them in terms of unfortunate conditions like that of schizophrenics who cannot help but express themselves in characteristically deviant ways. We dismiss them as devious misconduct when we have reasons to believe ulterior motives account for them, like the calculated ambiguities in political election campaigns or simply lies. Finally we dismiss them as entertaining curiosities when we can discount their reality, like the paradoxes that amused logicians for two thousand years until Whitehead and Russel's theory of logical types ruled them completely out of existence and meaningless. Note that all of these dismissals presuppose and are entirely based on assuming the authority to do so. Those who can dismiss what others get from their messages must be free of errors themselves else the errors others make would be confounded and not be recognizable as such, they must have access to objective norms else pathologies could not be judged, they must have superior knowledge about others' true motives else devious misconduct could not be established, and above all, they must have privileged access to an objective reality else magicians, paradoxes and if you want to add metaphors could not be ruled out of the domain of the scientific, the objective and the real. Needless to say, the dismissed one is left with no cognitive autonomy at all. This metaphorial entailment alone is astounding but let me add the other two. Secondly, differences that can't be dismissed may be submitted for mediation to another authority. This authority may be a distinguished person, an institutionalized procedure or both\_ When we ask a speaker to clarify what he or she said, we attribute thia authority to the originator. In fact, a whole rhetorical tradition makes a speaker'. intentions the ruler over what a correct interpretation is and I have actually no qualms about this when discourse is possible. But when authors cannot mediate between different readings there always are authorities, experts, rulers, judges, who are either invited or eager to impose their legitimate authority on such situations. Professors enjoy the privilege of institutional authority in grading students on what is relevant and how reality is to be interpreted. Scientific procedures too confer institutional authority on facts that non-scientists may not doubt for fear of the inevitable ridicule this would entail. But probably the most important institutional authority is the legal system. The interaction among lawyers, judges, law enforcement, etc. is designed to channel and mediate controversies that inevitably consist of conflicting interpretations of what the relevant facts are and whose solution is to be considered fair. By design, a court always dismisses all but one version. Thirdly, differences that can be neither dismissed nor resolved by mediation yield physical violence. Most physical violence in the United States occurs not on the streets, as television tries to make us believe, but in homes. And violence in families rarely is about food, love or children but about who is right and who has the authority to decide on the interpretation the other must accept as true. Also international conflicts are embedded in language, with one side claiming to be correct, honorable, historically justified and blaming the other for their unwillingness to share this one interpretation. I do not want to give the impression of believing that all violence is solely based on language, but that much of it is evidence of the sharing metaphor at work in situations in which it doesn't fit. The need for authority can also be recognized in the use of conduit metaphors. The similarity arises from the objectivity attributed to signs, symbols, information, etc., conceived of as flowing from one place to another. In expressions like "I am sending you a sign" ("this is a sign"), "this symbol means such and such," "this index points to something else," signs seem to function as stimuli if not as agents, regardless of whether anyone knows them and regardless of how someone choses to see them. Although semioticians maintain many distinction, for example between sign vehicles and referents and between signs whose referents are correlated by nature and symbols whose referents are established by convention, questions like "what does this symbol mean" can ultimately be answered only by an authority on the reality in which the symbol is assumed to exist as such. Questions like "what do you want this symbol to mean in your world" would not require such an authority but could also not be answered while believing that it is the symbols that flow.

#### CRISES ARE PART OF THE SYSTEM – CONVENTIONAL POLICYMAKING ONLY REINFORCES GLOBAL CRISES – WE MUST CHALLENGE OUR CIVILIZATION ITSELF OR RISK EVERY CRISIS AND MASSIVE GLOBAL VIOLENCE

Ahmed 11 [(Nafeez, international security analyst, runs a think-tank called the Institute for Policy Research and Development) “The Crisis of Civilization” Documentary, published 2011. Text from subtitles, accessible on http://crisisofcivilization.com/] AT

If we look at what's going on in the world today, we see so many different things happening at the same time and it can be very confusing trying to make sense of the debates around these things but when you actually look at these things holistically, it starts to make some sense. Unfortunately, what we have at the moment is a lot of people, in different fields, looking at everything in isolation. So you have one lot of people looking at climate change, one lot of people looking at energy a bunch of people looking at food, some other people looking at the economy, and some other guys looking at terrorism and foreign policy. And what I think is really important to do is to look at these things as part of the global system. And when you do that, you actually come away with a different perspective. My view, having looked at a lot of these trends, is that some of the most worrying predictions are most likely to be true. If you look at these things in their totality, what we're seeing is industrial civilization is unsustainable. And all of these different crises are really just different manifestations of the fact that this civilization, in its current form, cannot survive the 21st century. My name is Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, I'm an international security analyst, I run a think-tank in London called the Institute for Policy Research and Development I specialised in the study of mass violence, I've published extensively on terrorism, imperialism, and conflict. And in trying to understand mass violence, I've been looking more deeply at the systemic and structural issues, such as climate change, energy depletion, food production, economic crisis and how these crises interact with one another and how they can also aggravate and radicalise conflicts. I've been trying to understand what is actually going on in each of these crises, trying to get a grip on the debates between experts. So, for example, what is climate change? And is is real? What is energy depletion? Is it real? How does it work? Or are these things just something we are being told? And I've tried to really separate out vested interest from actual data and evidence. Vision is the most important of the human senses. We learn to see only as we practice using the eyes." When we're looking at these crises, we're looking at them in isolation; we're unable to see them as part of a whole. So, to the extent that you have climate scientists looking in a very narrow sense only at our interference with our environment. And looking only, for example, at environmental degradation. They are not able to see the links that that has directly with the structure of our global economy. And how that structure, in a way, compels us to go on this path of infinite growth. Just to survive, just to stop our businesses from failing they have to continue growing every year - they have to increase their profit. That's just your baseline for survival. So, the doctrine of unlimited growth is a failed doctrine. It cannot work and it's creating absolute disaster. But most of the experts looking at these things are only looking at them from their own lens. So, for them, is an invisible crisis because they don't really see the bigger picture. Most of the institutions which are working on these things are doing so on the basis of conventional policy making assumptions. These are now totally outmoded and highly questionable. Two of the most influential thinkers that have been responsible for some of these assumptions are Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama. Samuel Huntington was a Harvard professor. He was a political scientist and he was also a long-time advisor to the US government. He specifically advised president Lyndon Johnson on the Vietnam War. He became quite well-known for writing a book called "The Clash of Civilizations" in the 1990s. Where he projected that the future of international conflict would be between major civilization blocks - so, the Islamic world and the Western world. He separated these out and said that this is where there will be major conflict in the future. All I am saying is that in some non western cultures and Islam, and Confucian cultures are the usual examples - there is great resistance to accepting western values of human rights and democracy because these countries come from totally different cultural traditions." The other guy that is also very interesting is Francis Fukuyama, who used to be head of policy planning at the State Department. He wrote a book called "The End of History" and he argued that with the collapse of Communism there is no viable alternative to neo-liberal politics for economics. You know, the neo-liberal system where you have liberal democracies, the free market system, these have triumphed. We have no other system which can offer a viable alternative. Sure, if you want to measure greatness by purely selfish materialism, sure." "All right then, how do you want to measure it?" Well, there are other values, you know?" "Yeah, wait a minute, just a minute." What's wrong with this type of materialism? I mean, is the difference between life in the jungle and life in civilization." So, the ideas of Huntington and Fukuyama became kind of fused into this overall idea that the current system we have is, in fact, the most advanced system ever possible for humanity. And the violence that we have in this system are conflicts with lesser civilizations, such as the Muslim world. When you believe these things, when you believe the current system is the best we have, or when you believe that the War on Terror is just a war against crazy barbarians that hate us because of our freedom and our way of life you're out of touch with reality. And you don't really get the systemic causes of what's going on. So, when policy makers see things like climate change, peak oil, the economic crisis, or the fact that we are reaching limits in food production they try to deal with them in isolation. Instead of recognising that these crises are fundamentals of a failing global system. Because of this ideology, because of these subliminal ideas, we're straitjacketed and we're unable to respond in the way that we need to. Recognising that we need not just tinkering, but transformation of the system; but the question is how do we do that?

### The Severed Hand

#### Part 2 – the severed hand

Then what is the answer? Not to be deluded by dreams.

To know that great civilisations have broken down into violence,

and their tyrants come, many times before.

When open violence appears, to avoid it with honor or choose

the least ugly faction; these evils are essential.

To keep one’s own integrity, be merciful and uncorrupted

and not wish for evil; and not be duped

By dreams of universal justice or happiness. These dreams will

not be fulfilled.

To know this, and know that however ugly the parts appear

the whole remains beautiful. A severed hand

Is an ugly thing and man dissevered from the earth and stars

and his history … for contemplation or in fact …

Often appears atrociously ugly. Integrity is wholeness,

the greatest beauty is

Organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things, the divine beauty

of the universe. Love that, not man

Apart from that, or else you will share man’s pitiful confusions,

or drown in despair when his days darken.

#### Our very civilization is crumbling before our eyes, denying the myth of progress that development will constantly improve our lives – the machine of politics is dead – this isn’t a glitch in the system, the computer is corroding

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Those who witness extreme social collapse at first hand seldom describe any deep revelation about the truths of human existence. What they do mention, if asked, is their surprise at how easy it is to die. The pattern of ordinary life, in which so much stays the same from one day to the next, disguises the fragility of its fabric. How many of our activities are made possible by the impression of stability that pattern gives? So long as it repeats, or varies steadily enough, we are able to plan for tomorrow as if all the things we rely on and don’t think about too care- fully will still be there. When the pattern is broken, by civil war or natural disaster or the smaller-scale tragedies that tear at its fabric, many of those activities become impossible or meaningless, while simply meeting needs we once took for granted may occupy much of our lives. What war correspondents and relief workers report is not only the fragility of the fabric, but the speed with which it can unravel. As we write this, no one can say with certainty where the unravelling of the financial and commercial fabric of our economies will end. Meanwhile, beyond the cities, unchecked industrial exploitation frays the material basis of life in many parts of the world, and pulls at the ecological systems which sustain it. Precarious as this moment may be, however, an awareness of the fragility of what we call civilisation is nothing new. ‘Few men realise,’ wrote Joseph Conrad in 1896, ‘that their life, the very essence of their character, their capabilities and their audacities, are only the expression of their belief in the safety of their surroundings.’ Conrad’s writings exposed the civilisation exported by European imperialists to be little more than a comforting illusion, not only in the dark, unconquerable heart of Africa, but in the whited sepulchres of their capital cities. The inhabitants of that civilisation believed ‘blindly in the irresistible force of its institutions and its morals, in the power of its police and of its opinion,’ but their confidence could be maintained only by the seeming solidity of the crowd of like-minded believers surrounding them. Outside the walls, the wild remained as close to the surface as blood under skin, though the city-dweller was no longer equipped to face it directly. Bertrand Russell caught this vein in Conrad’s worldview, suggesting that the novelist ‘thought of civilised and morally tolerable human life as a dangerous walk on a thin crust of barely cooled lava which at any moment might break and let the unwary sink into fiery depths.’ What both Russell and Conrad were getting at was a simple fact which any historian could confirm: human civilisation is an intensely fragile construction. It is built on little more than belief: belief in the rightness of its values; belief in the strength of its system of law and order; belief in its currency; above all, perhaps, belief in its future. Once that belief begins to crumble, the collapse of a civilisation may become unstoppable. That civilisations fall, sooner or later, is as much a law of history as gravity is a law of physics. What remains after the fall is a wild mixture of cultural debris, confused and angry people whose certainties have betrayed them, and those forces which were always there, deeper than the foundations of the city walls: the desire to survive and the desire for meaning. \* It is, it seems, our civilisation’s turn to experience the inrush of the savage and the unseen; our turn to be brought up short by contact with untamed reality. There is a fall coming. We live in an age in which familiar restraints are being kicked away, and foundations snatched from under us. After a quarter century of complacency, in which we were invited to believe in bubbles that would never burst, prices that would never fall, the end of history, the crude repackaging of the triumphalism of Conrad’s Victorian twilight — Hubris has been introduced to Nemesis. Now a familiar human story is being played out. It is the story of an empire corroding from within. It is the story of a people who believed, for a long time, that their actions did not have consequences. It is the story of how that people will cope with the crumbling of their own myth. It is our story. This time, the crumbling empire is the unassailable global economy, and the brave new world of consumer democracy being forged worldwide in its name. Upon the indestructibility of this edifice we have pinned the hopes of this latest phase of our civilisation. Now, its failure and fallibility exposed, the world’s elites are scrabbling frantically to buoy up an economic machine which, for decades, they told us needed little restraint, for restraint would be its undoing. Uncountable sums of money are being funnelled upwards in order to prevent an uncontrolled explosion. The machine is stuttering and the engineers are in panic. They are wondering if perhaps they do not understand it as well as they imagined. They are wondering whether they are controlling it at all or whether, perhaps, it is controlling them. Increasingly, people are restless. The engineers group themselves into competing teams, but neither side seems to know what to do, and neither seems much different from the other. Around the world, discontent can be heard. The extremists are grinding their knives and moving in as the machine’s coughing and stuttering exposes the inadequacies of the political oligarchies who claimed to have everything in hand. Old gods are rearing their heads, and old answers: revolution, war, ethnic strife. Politics as we have known it totters, like the machine it was built to sustain. In its place could easily arise something more elemental, with a dark heart. As the financial wizards lose their powers of levitation, as the politicians and economists struggle to conjure new explanations, it starts to dawn on us that behind the curtain, at the heart of the Emerald City, sits not the benign and omnipotent invisible hand we had been promised, but something else entirely. Something responsible for what Marx, writing not so long before Conrad, cast as the ‘everlasting uncertainty and anguish’ of the ‘bourgeois epoch’; a time in which ‘all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.’ Draw back the curtain, follow the tireless motion of cogs and wheels back to its source, and you will find the engine driving our civilisation: the myth of progress. The myth of progress is to us what the myth of god-given warrior prowess was to the Romans, or the myth of eternal salvation was to the conquistadors: without it, our efforts cannot be sustained. Onto the root stock of Western Christianity, the Enlightenment at its most optimistic grafted a vision of an Earthly paradise, towards which human effort guided by calculative reason could take us. Following this guidance, each generation will live a better life than the life of those that went before it. History becomes an escalator, and the only way is up. On the top floor is human perfection. It is important that this should remain just out of reach in order to sustain the sensation of motion. Recent history, however, has given this mechanism something of a battering. The past century too often threatened a descent into hell, rather than the promised heaven on Earth. Even within the prosperous and liberal societies of the West progress has, in many ways, failed to deliver the goods. Today’s generation are demonstrably less content, and consequently less optimistic, than those that went before. They work longer hours, with less security, and less chance of leaving behind the social back- ground into which they were born. They fear crime, social breakdown, overdevelopment, environmental collapse. They do not believe that the future will be better than the past. Individually, they are less constrained by class and convention than their parents or grandparents, but more constrained by law, surveillance, state proscription and personal debt. Their physical health is better, their mental health more fragile. Nobody knows what is coming. Nobody wants to look. Most significantly of all, there is an underlying darkness at the root of everything we have built. Outside the cities, beyond the blurring edges of our civilisation, at the mercy of the machine but not under its control, lies something that neither Marx nor Conrad, Caesar nor Hume, Thatcher nor Lenin ever really understood. Something that Western civilisation — which has set the terms for global civilisation—was never capable of understanding, because to understand it would be to undermine, fatally, the myth of that civilisation. Something upon which that thin crust of lava is balanced; which feeds the machine and all the people who run it, and which they have all trained themselves not to see.

#### It is our responsibility as academics to undermine the myths behind our civilization – this project is too important to be left to politics alone and must be performed by art

The Dark Mountain 4 [(network of writers, artists and thinkers, includes David Abram, ecologist and geophilosopher, published in numerous scholarly journals; Charlotte Du Cann, writer, editor and community activist, Editor-in-Chief of Transition Free Press; Paul Kingsnorth, deputy-editor of The Ecologist, environmentalist and poet who writes for publications worldwide. “UNCIVILISATION: THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO” The Dark Mountain Project]

Mainstream art in the West has long been about shock; about busting taboos, about Getting Noticed. This has gone on for so long that it has become common to assert that in these ironic, exhausted, post-everything times, there are no taboos left to bust. But there is one. The last taboo is the myth of civilisation. It is built upon the stories we have constructed about our genius, our indestructibility, our manifest destiny as a chosen species. It is where our vision and our self-belief intertwine with our reckless refusal to face the reality of our position on this Earth. It has led the human race to achieve what it has achieved; and has led the planet into the age of ecocide. The two are intimately linked. We believe they must decoupled if anything is to remain. We believe that artists — which is to us the most welcoming of words, taking under its wing writers of all kinds, painters, musicians, sculptors, poets, designers, creators, makers of things, dreamers of dreams — have a responsibility to begin the process of decoupling. We believe that, in the age of ecocide, the last taboo must be broken — and that only artists can do it. Ecocide demands a response. That response is too important to be left to politicians, economists, conceptual thinkers, number crunchers; too all-pervasive to be left to activists or campaigners. Artists are needed. So far, though, the artistic response has been muted. In between traditional nature poetry and agitprop, what is there? Where are the poems that have adjusted their scope to the scale of this challenge? Where are the novels that probe beyond the country house or the city centre? What new form of writing has emerged to challenge civilisation itself? What gallery mounts an exhibition equal to this challenge? Which musician has discovered the secret chord? If the answers to these questions have been scarce up to now, it is perhaps both because the depth of collective denial is so great, and because the challenge is so very daunting. We are daunted by it, ourselves. But we believe it needs to be risen to. We believe that art must look over the edge, face the world that is coming with a steady eye, and rise to the challenge of ecocide with a challenge of its own: an artistic response to the crumbling of the empires of the mind. \* This response we call Uncivilised art, and we are interested in one branch of it in particular: Uncivilised writing. Uncivilised writing is writing which attempts to stand outside the human bubble and see us as we are: highly evolved apes with an array of talents and abilities which we are unleashing without sufficient thought, control, compassion or intelligence. Apes who have constructed a sophisticated myth of their own importance with which to sustain their civilising project. Apes whose project has been to tame, to control, to subdue or to destroy — to civilise the forests, the deserts, the wild lands and the seas, to impose bonds on the minds of their own in order that they might feel nothing when they exploit or destroy their fellow creatures. Against the civilising project, which has become the progenitor of ecocide, Uncivilised writing offers not a non-human perspective—we remain human and, even now, are not quite ashamed — but a perspective which sees us as one strand of a web rather than as the first palanquin in a glorious procession. It offers an unblinking look at the forces among which we find ourselves.It sets out to paint a picture of homo sapiens which a being from another world or, better, a being from our own — a blue whale, an albatross, a mountain hare — might recognise as something approaching a truth. It sets out to tug our attention away from ourselves and turn it outwards; to uncentre our minds. It is writing, in short, which puts civilisation — and us — into perspective. Writing that comes not, as most writing still does, from the self-absorbed and self-congratulatory metropolitan centres of civilisation but from somewhere on its wilder fringes. Somewhere woody and weedy and largely avoided, from where insistent, uncomfortable truths about ourselves drift in; truths which we’re not keen on hearing. Writing which unflinchingly stares us down, however uncomfortable this may prove. It might perhaps be just as useful to explain what Uncivilised writing is not. It is not environmental writing, for there is much of that about already, and most of it fails to jump the barrier which marks the limit of our collective human ego; much of it, indeed, ends up shoring-up that ego, and helping us to persist in our civilisational delusions. It is not nature writing, for there is no such thing as nature as distinct from people, and to suggest otherwise is to perpetuate the attitude which has brought us here. And it is not political writing, with which the world is already flooded, for politics is a human confection, complicit in ecocide and decaying from within. Uncivilised writing is more rooted than any of these. Above all, it is determined to shift our worldview, not to feed into it. It is writing for outsiders.

#### The poetry I read above was a performance of Uncivilization, redrawing the maps of the world to chart out new paths that confront the collapse of our civilization – civilized modes of that fail to account for our physical location and have disastrous consequences – voting affirmative is an expression of solidarity with uncivilization

The Dark Mountain 5 [(network of writers, artists and thinkers, includes David Abram, ecologist and geophilosopher, published in numerous scholarly journals; Charlotte Du Cann, writer, editor and community activist, Editor-in-Chief of Transition Free Press; Paul Kingsnorth, deputy-editor of The Ecologist, environmentalist and poet who writes for publications worldwide. “UNCIVILISATION: THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO” The Dark Mountain Project]

If you want to be loved, it might be best not to get involved, for the world, at least for a time, will resolutely refuse to listen. A salutary example of this last point can be found in the fate of one of the twentieth century’s most significant yet most neglected poets. Robinson Jeffers was writing Uncivilised verse seventy years before this manifesto was thought of, though he did not call it that. In his early poetic career, Jeffers was a star: he appeared on the cover of Time magazine, read his poems in the US Library of Congress and was respected for the alternative he offered to the Modernist juggernaut. Today his work is left out of anthologies, his name is barely known and his politics are regarded with suspicion. Read Jeffers’ later work and you will see why. His crime was to deliberately puncture humanity’s sense of self-importance. His punishment was to be sent into a lonely literary exile from which, forty years after his death, he has still not been allowed to return. But Jeffers knew what he was in for. He knew that nobody, in an age of ‘consumer choice’, wanted to be told by this stone-faced prophet of the California cliffs that ‘it is good for man … To know that his needs and nature are no more changed in fact in ten thousand years than the beaks of eagles.’ He knew that no comfortable liberal wanted to hear his angry warning, issued at the height of the Second World War: ‘Keep clear of the dupes that talk democracy / And the dogs that talk revolution / Drunk with talk, liars and believers … / Long live freedom, and damn the ideologies.’ His vision of a world in which humanity was doomed to destroy its surroundings and eventually itself (‘I would burn my right hand in a [14] slow fire / To change the future … I should do foolishly’) was furiously rejected in the rising age of consumer democracy which he also predicted (‘Be happy, adjust your economics to the new abundance…’) Jeffers, as his poetry developed, developed a philosophy too. He called it ‘inhumanism.’ It was, he wrote: a shifting of emphasis and significance from man to notman; the rejection of human solipsism and recognition of the transhuman magnificence…This manner of thought and feeling is neither misanthropic nor pessimist … It offers a reasonable detachment as rule of conduct, instead of love, hate and envy… it provides magnificence for the religious instinct, and satisfies our need to admire greatness and rejoice in beauty. The shifting of emphasis from man to notman: this is the aim of Uncivilised writing. To ‘unhumanise our views a little, and become confident / As the rock and ocean that we were made from.’ This is not a rejection of our humanity — it is an affirmation of the wonder of what it means to be truly human. It is to accept the world for what it is and to make our home here, rather than dreaming of relocating to the stars, or existing in a Man-forged bubble and pretending to ourselves that there is nothing outside it to which we have any connection at all. This, then, is the literary challenge of our age. So far, few have taken it up. The signs of the times flash out in urgent neon, but our literary lions have better things to read. Their art remains stuck in its own civilised bubble. The idea of civilisation is entangled, right down to its semantic roots, with city-dwelling, and this provokes a thought: if our writers seem unable to find new stories which might lead us through the times ahead, is this not a function of their metropolitan mentality? The big names of contemporary literature are equally at home in the fashionable quarters of London or New York, and their writing reflects the prejudices of the placeless, transnational elite to which they belong. The converse also applies. Those voices which tell other stories tend to be rooted in a sense of place. Think of John Berger’s novels and essays from the Haute Savoie, or the depths explored by Alan Garner within a day’s walk of his birthplace in Cheshire. Think of Wendell Berry or WS Merwin, Mary Oliver or Cormac McCarthy. Those whose writings [15] approach the shores of the Uncivilised are those who know their place, in the physical sense, and who remain wary of the siren cries of metrovincial fashion and civilised excitement. If we name particular writers whose work embodies what we are arguing for, the aim is not to place them more prominently on the existing map of literary reputations. Rather, as Geoff Dyer has said of Berger, to take their work seriously is to redraw the maps altogether — not only the map of literary reputations, but those by which we navigate all areas of life. Even here, we go carefully, for cartography itself is not a neutral activity. The drawing of maps is full of colonial echoes. The civilised eye seeks to view the world from above, as something we can stand over and survey. The Uncivilised writer knows the world is, rather, something we are enmeshed in — a patchwork and a framework of places, experiences, sights, smells, sounds. Maps can lead, but can also mislead. Our maps must be the kind sketched in the dust with a stick, washed away by the next rain. They can be read only by those who ask to see them, and they cannot be bought. This, then, is Uncivilised writing. Human, inhuman, stoic and entirely natural. Humble, questioning, suspicious of the big idea and the easy answer. Walking the boundaries and reopening old conversations. Apart but engaged, its practitioners always willing to get their hands dirty; aware, in fact, that dirt is essential; that keyboards should be tapped by those with soil under their fingernails and wilderness in their heads. We tried ruling the world; we tried acting as God’s steward, then we tried ushering in the human revolution, the age of reason and isolation. We failed in all of it, and our failure destroyed more than we were even aware of. The time for civilisation is past. Uncivilisation, which knows its flaws because it has participated in them; which sees unflinchingly and bites down hard as it records — this is the project we must embark on now. This is the challenge for writing — for art — to meet. This is what we are here for. A movement needs a beginning. An expedition needs a base camp. A project needs a headquarters. Uncivilisation is our project, and the promotion of Uncivilised writing — and art — needs a base. We present this manifesto not simply because we have something to say—who doesn’t?—but because we have something to do. We hope this pamphlet has created a spark. If so, we have a responsibility to fan the flames. This is what we intend to do. But we can’t do it alone. This is a moment to ask deep questions and to ask them urgently. All around us, shifts are under way which suggest that our whole way of living is already passing into history. It is time to look for new paths and new stories, ones that can lead us through the end of the world as we know it and out the other side. We suspect that by questioning the foundations of civilisation, the myth of human centrality, our imagined isolation, we may find the beginning of such paths. If we are right, it will be necessary to go literally beyond the Pale. Outside the stockades we have built — the city walls, the original marker in stone or wood that first separated ‘man’ from ‘nature’. Beyond the gates, out into the wilderness, is where we are headed. And there we shall make for the higher ground for, as Jeffers wrote, ‘when the cities lie at the monster’s feet / There are left the mountains.’ We shall make the pilgrimage to the poet’s Dark Mountain, to the great, immovable, inhuman heights which were here before us and will be here after, and from their slopes we shall look back upon the pinprick lights of the distant cities and gain perspective on who we are and what we have become. This is the Dark Mountain project. It starts here. Where will it end? Nobody knows. Where will it lead? We are not sure. Its first incarnation, launched alongside this manifesto, is a website, which points the way to the ranges. It will contains thoughts, scribblings, jottings, ideas; it will work up the project of Uncivilisation, and invite all comers to join the discussion. Then it will become a physical object, because virtual reality is, ultimately, no reality at all. It will become a journal, of paper, card, paint and print; of ideas, thoughts, observations, mumblings; new stories which will help to define the project — the school, the movement — of Uncivilised writing. It will collect the words and the images of those who consider themselves Uncivilised and have something to say about it; who want to help us attack the citadels. It will be a thing of beauty for the eye and for the heart and for the mind, for we are unfashionable enough to believe that beauty — like truth — not only exists, but still matters. Beyond that… all is currently hidden from view. It is a long way across the plains, and things become obscured by distance. There are great white spaces on this map still. The civilised would fill them in; we are not so sure we want to. But we cannot resist exploring them, navigating by rumours and by the stars. We don’t know quite what we will find. We are slightly nervous. But we will not turn back, for we believe that something enormous may be out there, waiting to meet us. Uncivilisation, like civilisation, is not something that can be created alone. Climbing the Dark Mountain cannot be a solitary exercise. We need bearers, sherpas, guides, fellow adventurers. We need to rope ourselves together for safety. At present, our form is loose and nebulous. It will firm itself up as we climb. Like the best writing, we need to be shaped by the ground beneath our feet, and what we become will be shaped, at least in part, by what we find on our journey. If you would like to climb at least some of the way with us, we would like to hear from you. We feel sure there are others out there who would relish joining us on this expedition.

#### Jeffers challenges the myth of civilization, allowing us to deal with the collapse of our civilization and live ethically without making this the end of humanity

Brown 11 [(Andrew, writer) “The Answer” http://andrewjbrown.blogspot.com/2011/03/answer.html March 20] AT

Well, it's not just been a hard day of course, but a hard few weeks in which we have seen continued unrest and violence in North Africa and the Persian Gulf, the earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan and, in the latter, of course, the appalling tsunami and ongoing nuclear incident. All this, as we are aware, is going on against a developing unsettled political, financial and cultural situation here in the UK and Europe and, in one way or another - unless you are deliberately doing that very popular head-in-the-sand thing, we are all feeling that it's getting 'harder to understand it' and are asking how much is it all worth? At such unsettled and disturbing times many, naturally, start again to seek answers to 'the problems of life'. There will be plenty of churches and religions in the coming years that will serve up a variety of proscriptive, hard and simple answers - believe A, B and C and all will be well. But, here at least, we know that much, most even, of what is and will be on offer is of no more use than snake-oil. So, what answer is on offer here - what would help us both feel we could say we understood the world and, even as we face so many hard things, we could also live with a measure equanimity and even occasional joy? It would be nice for me - certainly a weight off my shoulders - to be able to point you to a ready-made collectively agreed answer liberal but that simply doesn't exist amongst us here or more widely within our General Assembly nor amongst liberal churches as a whole. So, with all due apologies, all I can do is offer you an outline of the answer that strikes me as being true. There are a million ways I might present it but, to keep it brief, I'll hang it on Robinson Jeffers' poem 'The Answer'. Then what is the answer? Not to be deluded by dreams. To know that great civilisations have broken down into violence, and their tyrants come, many times before. When open violence appears, to avoid it with honor or choose the least ugly faction; these evils are essential. To keep one’s own integrity, be merciful and uncorrupted and not wish for evil; and not be duped By dreams of universal justice or happiness. These dreams will not be fulfilled. To know this, and know that however ugly the parts appear the whole remains beautiful. A severed hand Is an ugly thing and man dissevered from the earth and stars and his history ... for contemplation or in fact ... Often appears atrociously ugly. Integrity is wholeness, the greatest beauty is Organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things, the divine beauty of the universe. Love that, not man Apart from that, or else you will share man’s pitiful confusions, or drown in despair when his days darken. So now let's walk through it. What does Jeffers see as the answer? Jeffers begins simply enough by saying, it is not 'to be deluded by dreams.' OK, but there are dreams and dreams - and so he turns immediately to clarifying what kind of dreams we must not be deluded by. Jeffers tells us that great civilisations have broken down into violence, and that their tyrants have come, many times before. The dream to avoid is, then, of harbouring any thought that any human civilisation is a permanent fixture in the scheme of things. Although this is a generally accepted truth that most of us have no problem acknowledging - after all Shelly's 'Ozymandias' has gone into our cultural canon - Jeffers wants us to realise that this is, of course, true of our own civilization right here, right now and it's clearly overdue (in Chris Woods' memorable phrase) for a grand correction to commence. Jeffers continues to unfold this thought by saying that 'When open violence appears' we are 'to avoid it with honor or choose the least ugly faction'. Here he reminds us that although we must, really must, try our hardest to avoid violence if we cannot do this in honourable ways then we have to choose the least ugly faction for to do otherwise would be to commit an existential betrayal too deep to countenance. Jeffers remains clear, however, that violence remains for human-kind an evil even as it seems to be an essential - if highly regrettable - aspect of our species. But, Jeffers feels that even as we acknowledge this essential evil, this does not mean at the same time that we as individuals and small communities need to embrace it as central, and he is clear that at a more primal level it is possible for us to 'keep [our] own integrity and to 'be merciful and uncorrupted and not wish for evil.' But for Jeffers this way of being is highly localised and it flourishes best and most widely when we don't tie it to fixed and monolithic human ideologies concerning what might be the best kind of civilisation. So he wants us to be absolutely clear that our integrity, mercy and incorruptibility is intimately related to our ability 'not be duped / By dreams of universal justice or happiness' because, he says, 'these dreams will not be fulfilled.' Why? Well, remember these words are being presented in the light of his opening lines which makes it clear he thinks that even if we were to succeed in creating the utopian civilisation we dreamt of, it, too, will in time, break down into violence and out of it tyrants will come. Now to many people all this seems an utterly bleak and painfully circular vision. You act on a good utopian vision and try to build a new society or civilisation upon it, but, says Jeffers (and history), it will inevitably fall back into violence and repression. In the inevitable fight that follows someone else will be forced to pick the least ugly faction with its new dreams and, if they win and succeed in creating a new society it, too, will in time, break down once more into violence and out of it tyrants will come. (Remember, even Emerson, that most optimistic of writers, once said that: 'The end of the human race will be that it will eventually die of civilisation.') But that's not the end of it for Jeffers thinks we that this bleak vision is only certain to occur in so far as we continue to subscribe to the myth of the centrality of humankind and its insatiable desire to civilise the world

*- that is to say to make it conform merely to human dreams. (People may be interested in following this link to the Dark Mountain Project which is concerned to articulate this more clearly. I've joined recently joined this grassroots network myself). Well, it's not just been a hard day of course, but a hard few weeks in which we have seen continued unrest and violence in North Africa and the Persian Gulf, the earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan and, in the latter, of course, the appalling tsunami and ongoing nuclear incident. All this, as we are aware, is going on against a developing unsettled political, financial and cultural situation here in the UK and Europe and, in one way or another - unless you are deliberately doing that very popular head-in-the-sand thing, we are all feeling that it's getting 'harder to understand it' and are asking how much is it all worth? At such unsettled and disturbing times many, naturally, start again to seek answers to 'the problems of life'. 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#### The myth of progress lives on within educational institutions – our reading of poetry writes the mythos back in to a society that lacks it

Wilson [(James Matthew Wilson is an Assistant Professor at Villanova University) “Logos Severed from Mythos: The Consequences of Our Forgetting” Anamnesis Journal 2012] AT

We arrive, then, at a further consequence: the shape of higher education has felt the impact of this hollowing out. Our administrators, faculty, and students see that the intellectual “function” seems to have as its object an exacting and abstract method removed from the happiness proper to human life. Disenchanted with this species of reason, recognizing its vacuity but unable to see an alternative, since the middle of the last century, many of us have been complicit in efforts to make educational institutions—if not the intellectual life—“relevant.” Rather than critiquing abstract rationalism in terms of the drama of intellect and the joy of contemplation known in the past, those in positions of authority set up the facile dualism of abstraction and concretion; they seek to remodel the life of the university on concrete action to the exclusion of what they now view as the fearful loneliness of thought.5 Increasingly, we see students called to “social awareness,” exhorted to “effect social change” by engaging in charitable service as part of or as the total content of their course work. We no longer tolerate a place where these activities might be acknowledged as important, but secondary, elements of a good life; an imperative to ease the material human estate blots out the possibility of an end beyond it and superior to it. We fear to offend the “less mentally-abled” by proposing that the life of contemplation might be superior to the practical life, since it is the point of contact between the human soul and the divine. Instead of thought, we have information sessions: course work in the humanities becomes a positivist form of history and sociology intended to excite indignation and lead to “service,” the raising of funds in a charitable campaign, or, at least, the hand-wringing of “white guilt.” ((See, Paul Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Toward a Secular Theocracy (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2002). )) At most contemporary American Catholic universities, the Catholic “mission” of the university is most in evidence just at those points on which liberal society in general has already reached a consensus: the distribution of recycling bins, the use of the buzzwords “green” and “sustainability,” hospitality to the disabled, and corporal works of mercy for the poor. In their proper place, I would strongly approve of nearly all these initiatives. If they serve, however, as a substitute for the intellectual tradition to which Catholic universities are scions, then they have at their root a set of ideas that we willfully keep ourselves too busy and diverted to contemplate. This relentless hum of good will serves to distract us from the fact that we no longer believe in the capacities of human reason to know the truth; we no longer believe the truth could regard anything greater than the crude, intractable matter we seek to control in the name of bodily comfort; we begin to suspect, as it were, that if silence should fall upon our mind and our hearts for a moment, we might awaken to discover the world and ourselves are alike empty of meaning.6 One seldom hears, against this restless and evasive nihilism, an authoritative voice raised to echo Aquinas that the ultimate end of human life is our contemplative knowledge of and intellectual assimilation to God.7 I am aware that the world is not dying from an excess of charitable works, though many of those works may themselves be dead to the real spirit of caritas.8 In the West, at least, we see our intellectual and spiritual emptiness compensated for less by self-giving than by consumption.9 In particular, we fixate upon the creation and commoditization of new technologies for, I think, a very curious reason. The narrative of “unstoppable” material progress, of technological advancements that will relieve us of the burdens of mortality, the labors of survival, the contingent determinism of nature regarding our weight, sex, and the shape of our noses—this seems to be the one story still permitted public recognition as rational. The story of technology receives such deference because we confuse the power it provides with reason; it must be good, it must be a testimony to some kind of human greatness. It provides a meaningful narrative to a society otherwise lacking, and it makes us think we are rational gods when in fact we are superstitious slaves. Why else would it happen that the mere suggestion that computers are not an unmixed good can excite wrath in the breasts of otherwise complacent and amiable, if sterile, persons?10 Here, contemporary higher education comes in for one more bit of opprobrium. Most humanities and social science courses preach this narrative of technological progress in such a way that it would seem the summons to charitable service amounts to little more than helping those in poorer countries access the garden of technological delights in which we freely romp. Having said that, many other courses couch themselves as critical of Western consumption and power; they generally do so exclusively in the form of criticism—that is, in the attempt to undermine the assumptions of our experience by exposing their manipulative ideological structures. Because this always remains a strictly anti-Western or anti-capitalist position that refuses to offer a more robust or dignified account of human life than that offered on every airwave and video screen, even the most savage criticisms of Western technocratic and ideological drives to domination wind up merely liberating their students from what little sense of ethical obligation or intellectual calling they are likely to have acquired within this generally amoral order. In a word, the greatest ally of a society entirely organized in terms of exchange between corporations, state social services, and private consumers is the Western Marxist tradition of culture critique; in claiming to expose the lines of power to criticism, it merely prompts students to see no purpose to their lives beyond seeking a power of their own. This de facto alliance has overcome its de jure antagonism and become most comically evident in such things as the rise to institutional respectability of media and cultural studies. In the study of cartoons and soap operas, our students learn the most banal of lessons: the bottom line to all the claptrap regarding the true, the good, and the beautiful is the cliché that the “customer is always right.” Sometimes, it just so happens, he does not always know the reason he is right, and that is why the professors of media studies must scribble their monographs. This singular public narrative of technological progress, power, and pleasure gives rise to the proliferation of private narratives deprived of any ethical or rational status. To wit, the tales of the talking cure, unfolded on the psychologist’s couch. The triumph of the therapeutic reveals at once the vanquishing and the vindication of human life as a story and human reason’s dependence on story-telling. The therapeutic narrative, to be sure, is rife with unfortunate elements. It presumes the total isolation of the feelings of the interior, subjective state from the objective conditions of nature and ethical discourse, so that psychological therapy becomes a stoic exercise in interior adjustment to inalterable external conditions. So, too, it despairs of such confessions having any purchase on reason, or reason any purchase on them. The patient’s task is simply to state the raw feeling of experience, upon which reason operates only to make a diagnosis. This last, private refuge of storytelling not only robs it of ethical or rational force, but it has the effect of narrowing the kinds of stories we are capable of telling about ourselves. As has been noted for decades, we find our popular narratives conform to the stock fixtures of therapy: trauma, mourning, revenge (or “acting out”), and interior-adjustment. And yet, the very fact that human beings feel compelled to tell these stories indicates not how traumatized we all actually are, but our need for the more varied conventions of story-telling that become available when story-telling itself is readmitted to the public realm as a source and basis of wisdom. This re-admittance, and not an increase in the number of psychologists, or the already-under-way switching of method from the “talking cure” to the prescription of psychotropic drugs, is the solution to the conditions modern psychology generally misdiagnoses. The causes of the aforementioned phenomena are, no doubt, multiple and complex. My argument is not so crude as to suggest that the exile of mythos from logos, or rather, the abstraction of logos from the condition of its possibility, has alone been their progenitor. Other factors have helped misshape the modern university and sent untold millions in search of therapy. But surely there is a causal relation. I have tried primarily to make the case that our age misunderstands the nature of stories and of reason alike; that this misunderstanding has its roots in Plato, but that Plato himself gives us salient reasons to reject it. Further, I have tried to suggest that human experience outside the precincts of classical philosophy detects instinctively the reliance of logos on mythos. Our predicament is that we have failed to take stories seriously enough for them to merit the serious attention of anyone besides our therapist. Plato’s pedagogical theory of poetry has, in this regard, one further lesson to teach us. If we have formed our own pre-rational sensibilities on the irrelevance of stories to rational thought, and on the irrelevance of reasoning to the narrative form of human life, then we risk making ourselves unwittingly insensible to a reality on which our happiness fundamentally depends. Nothing could be more irrational than that.

## A2 Other Poems

### Myth of Nature Adv

#### It also challenges the myth of nature

Brown 11 [(Andrew, writer) “The Answer” http://andrewjbrown.blogspot.com/2011/03/answer.html March 20] AT

Jeffers begins to challenge this myth by introducing a theme which runs throughout his work namely, that 'however ugly the parts appear the whole remains beautiful.' But be careful to remember, as I have been showing you over the last couple of weeks, that Jeffers' understanding of beauty runs right up to the very edge of the abyss that is the Sublime - that greatness with which nothing else can be compared and which is beyond all possibility of calculation, measurement or imitation. Because Jeffers' vision is born out of being prepared to survey whatever one sees with a steady, clear-eyed acceptance his understanding of in what consists beauty is no easy one. One of the things he sees with his steady and clear-eyed gaze is that 'A severed hand / Is an ugly thing and man dissevered from the earth and stars and his history ... for contemplation or in fact ... Often appears atrociously ugly.' Jeffers is pushing us hard to see how an exclusive human frame of reference, one which lies behind so many of our activities especially the creation of civilisations, severs us from the earth and stars and our history and makes us appear often atrociously ugly. Civilisation severs us from the earth because it has all too often made us think of the earth as something other than us, some 'thing' which we can master and use as mere resource and upon which we think we can walk when, instead, it is the dark, mysterious matter out of which we come, within which we are indissolubly commingled, and \*through\* which we move. Civilisation severs us from the stars because it has all too often made us think of them as revolving around us at the centre of the universe rather than as mutually interdependent brother and sister worlds whose dust is our dust, whose earth is our earth. Civilisation severs us from history because it makes us think that it is possible in one fell swoop to create the New Jerusalem - to become some new ideal race and civilisation without first doing the hard work of uncentering ourselves and dispelling the myth of civilisation. As Jeffers says in another poem, Carmel Point, 'We must uncenter our minds from ourselves; / We must unhumanize our views a little, and become confident / As the rock and ocean that we were made from.' Jeffers thought we began to live a wise, unhuman, uncivilised life when we succeed in concentrating on what he calls 'Organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things'. It is only by diving deeply into this wholeness that we can begin to find a real, primal 'integrity' in which we can touch 'the divine beauty of the universe' - a beauty which is there even when we are not. The answer, then, for Jeffers, is to love this Sublime beauty, this organic wholeness and 'not man / Apart from [this]' because, if we do not, we will continue to 'share man’s pitiful confusions, or drown in despair when his days darken.' The first ten years of this century seem to me to be riddled through with countless pitiful confusions and in so many ways I see our days darken. But, for all that, again and again, when I take time to notice the organic wholeness of life and things I see nothing but divine beauty. This spring, more than any I have experienced before, the beauty about which I have just spoken has hit the core of my being. I know it will be there whatever we stupid and thoughtless creatures do and, in that beauty, I know I can rest as confident as the rock and ocean I was made from. I know I can go on in hope and a measure of joy even as the waves crash in and the crazy warmongers (whether our own or others) fight yet more stupid wars. Just hold on to Jeffers' answer - that integrity is beauty and that he greatest beauty is organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things, the divine beauty of things. Love this and not the man apart from it. So live and be joyful even in these darkening days.

#### The first piece of dark mountain evidence impacts this – seeing ourselves as separate from nature cuases environmental harm

## 1AR Case Frontlines

### A2 No Collapse---Resources

#### Civilization is on course to total collapse – this happens pretty regularly

Rees 3 [(William E. Rees, Former Director, School of Community and Regional Planning University of British Columbia) “IS HUMANITY FATALLY SUCCESSFUL?” JBAPA, Vol. 30-31, 2002-03] AT

The notion that we are not sufficiently conscious of our own na- ture has been a persistent theme in the literature of many countries. Listen to Anton Chekhov: “Man will become better only when you make him see what he is like.” Or perhaps you prefer W.H . Auden: “We are lived by forces we can scarcely understand.” I believe that coming to understand these forces will give us a chance to take a great evolutionary step forward to the point where sound intelligence incorporated into our cultural “programming” holds sway over more well-tested, biologically-determined, but increasingly dangerous behavioural patterns. My second major premise should already be obvious, namely that if humans are the product of evolution, we are also the product of Darwinian natural selection. Uniquely, however, human evolution is as much determined by socio-cultural as by biological factors. This means, of course, that both cultural and biological “mutations” are subject to natural selection. Everyone recognizes that maladaptive physical mutations will be “selected out” in an environment for which they are unsuitable. It is less well appreciated that, like biological mu- tations, ill-suited socio-cultural patterns can also be selected out. To reiterate this central idea, culture now as much determines the human future as biology but, like disadvantageous physical characteristics, unfit cultural traits will be eliminated by evolutionary forces. We can find support for this assertion in both ancient and more recent history. One of the most interesting cases – one that even makes the popular press from time to time – is the story of Easter Island, a small button of land of about 165 square kilometres (65 square miles) in the South Pacific 2,250 kilometres (1400 miles) from the nearest land mass, another smallish Island, Pitcairn. Easter was a verdant subtropical island, heavily forested with at least two very important tree species and many plant and animal species useful to humans. It was first inhabited only around the year 450 or 500 A.D when probably no more than two or three canoe-loads of Polynesian explorer-sailors landed on its shores. The new colony took hold and grew over the next 10 centuries into a kind of microcosmic culture. Over that period, the Easter Islanders developed class structure, di- vision of labour, a priesthood and religion, agriculture, science and art , including some of the finest stonework – both fitted stones for buildings and platforms, and carvings - known to preindustrial times. In short, Easter Island society had most of the basic manifestations and characteristics of the much grander and earlier human cultures of Europe, Africa, Asia and even the Americas (Incas and Aztecs), with which most people are more familiar. The population flourished, growing to around 10,000 (perhaps as few or as 7000 or many as 20,000) people by A.D. 1400-1500. But then something rather mystifying happened. Easter Islanders cut down the last palm tree growing on their isolated rock. Easter Island was a culture entirely dependent on the forest for their buildings, for log rollers to move their massive carvings, and, most important, for the dugout canoes by which they obtained most of their animal pro- tein. Easter Islanders ate porpoises and fish that could be obtained only by active pursuit in boats. How could this have happened? Whatever were they thinking? Easter Island’s population was small enough that everyone must have at least recognized just about everyone else. One could walk around the island in about two days, so presumably everyone was aware that the forest was disappearing and that a crisis was upon them. There was probably much discussion of what might happen if the forest disappeared and maybe even heated political debates about what to do. And yet, for whatever reason, any effort to change the established pattern of resource exploitation, any move toward a conservation plan, clearly failed – in the end the last tree was felled. When Europeans (the Dutch explorer Roggeveen) discovered Easter Island in A.D 1722, the population had fallen to something like 2,000 sorry souls. These people were living in rude reed huts and caves —houses had been destroyed, and art and science abandoned. The human dregs of the Easter Island culture that had been thriving just 200 years earlier now survived, in part, on cannibalistic raids on each others’ encampments. The secret of Easter Island’s implosion has slowly been revealed by mud core samples taken from the swamps in the interior of the island. Paleobotanists have examined the pollen profile laid down through the island’s entire 1500-year post-discovery history. What they learned is that, one by one, the important species of resource plants disappeared. The pollen record suggests that the last specimens of the critical palm tree came down around 1400. Meanwhile, Eas- ter Island’s midden heaps tell a similar story. Here we can trace the dietary history of Easter Island society, including the disappearance, one after another, of valuable food species. Most critically, around 1500, fish bones and porpoise bones disappear from the record to be replaced a few years or decades later by human bones. What could possibly be going on if virtually every member of a society is aware of their society’s dependence on limited local resources, of their utter isolation from any other sources of supply, and yet the people do nothing to prevent the destruction of their own prospects. Many articles have been written about Easter Island. Brit- ish public servant and historian Clive Ponting (1990) was mystified that the Easter Islanders seemed “...unable to devise a system that would allow them to find the right balance with their environment.” Most relevant to the present discussion, Jared Diamond’s (1995) asks “Are we about to follow their lead?” Think about it. Virtually everyone on Earth is aware that we have an ecological crisis and a population problem, and now there is fear of increasing geopoliti- cal strife. We are utterly dependent on the resources of a tiny planet isolated in space with no hope of finding alternative supplies, and, yet, we too seem unable to devise a system that will allow us to find the right balance with our environment. Ominously, Easter Island is no exception. Joseph Tainter (author of “The Collapse of Complex Societies,” 1988) has observed that “what is perhaps most intriguing in the evolution of human societies is the regularity with which the pattern of increasing complexity is interrupted by collapse...” (Tainter 1995). Perhaps, then, ignomini- ous collapse is the norm for complex societies. But, surely, you protest, modern society is different. We know better. Our technological prowess and mastery over nature distinguish us from more primitive cultures. We can avoid crises by reading the warnings, by responding positively to data and analysis. Well, this sounds good – certainly one of our most cherished contemporary beliefs is that is that we are a science-based culture. But what’s the de facto modern record? In a controversial paper reviewing the recent record of human exploitation of natural resources, some of my UBC colleagues (Ludwig et al. 1993) concluded that: “Although there is a considerable variation in detail, there is remarkable consistency in the history of resource exploitation. Resources are invariably or in- evitably overexploited, often to the point of collapse or extinction.” Another UBC colleague, Daniel Pauly, has conducted path-break- ing research on the current state of the world’s fisheries. Something like 75% of the world’s fish stocks have been overexploited by hu- mans. Pauly has demonstrated that although the FAO-measured fish catches each year remain relatively constant, it’s not because we’re managing well, but rather because we eliminate one species or one stock and simply move on to another. We are literally “fishing down the food web,” sweeping up the ocean’s bounty as we go (Pauly et al. 1998, Pauly and MacLean 2003). More recently, Myers and Worm (2003) and Christensen et al. (2003) report that only 10 percent of the original biomass of predatory fish remain in the world’s oceans after just 50 years of industrial fishing and that remaining specimens are a fraction of the size of their forebears a few decades ago. The list goes on. A recent article in the Globe & Mail described the threat to certain orchids because of human over-harvesting. In some African countries, orchid tubers are a favoured food, and easier trade has opened up wider markets for these tubers. This situation is fairly typical. When any valuable species – particularly rare ones like these orchids – is exposed to a globalizing marketplace, there will always be people willing to pay top dollar to have it, down to the last remaining specimen. And so we see growing international trade in rare and endangered plants and animals (or their parts). Global- ization is a major threat to their survival because humans have little inhibition against destroying non-human species if they profit in the short term from doing so. To summarize, there is evidence enough in both the historicalrecord and present trends to support the assertion that H. sapiens is inherently biased against sustainability by nature. This socio-behavioural bias has led to frequent societal collapses in the past and modern society is far from being invulnerable. Modern society is far from being invulnerable. Indeed, I would argue that unsustainability is an inevitable emergent property of the interaction of growth-bound, techno-industrial society and the ecosphere. By this I mean that it doesn’t much matter how one reconfigures the system at the margins, it won’t make much difference. Industrial society is being propelled to the precipice by certain deep-seated (genetically-based) behavioural tendencies that are actually being reinforced by contemporary values and beliefs.

#### Nothing is safe – everything will collapse by 2030, even your ethical systems; confirmed by history – demands to keep things the same are made by selfish elites and should be rejected

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

Industrial civilisation has global reach, the first and the only civilisation in history to achieve this, and therefore its collapse will also be global. The beginning of this collapse, the first stage, which we call the break- down of global capitalism, is, we believe, already occurring and will occur grosso modo in the 2000-2030 period. However, the collapse of industrial civilisation itself will not be sudden and total, but rather a long, complex and differentiated process, with possible fluctuations, though always heading downwards, exhibiting a gradual ‘decay’. This is what Greer (2008) has called the Long Decline of Industrial Civili- sation, a decline that will likely last 200 to 300 years, a period of time similar to that of its development. No one alive today will see the end of the process, but it will perhaps be socially imaginable around the year 2030. By then the crisis of our current way of life and production may be an actual fact, with increasing and generalised blackouts, a crisis in transport systems and the operation of the metropolis, a crisis in the scientific-technological system, in social and cultural organisation, institutional structures, value systems, social ethics, and cosmo-visions – in sum, everything that defines a civilisation. Even the dazzling and supposedly immaterial Information and Communication Society will be in serious crisis by then. It also will not be immune, as we shall see a global energy decline and a scarcity of resources, and its crisis will further impact on the breakdown of global capitalism. Throughout history, complex societies have consistently been incapable of addressing the crisis of civilisation (Tainter, 1988) and have entered processes of profound collapse for different reasons. Moreover, frequently the elites put forward ‘solutions’ to these crises that were often counterproductive and in fact precipitated their swifter collapse. This occasion is no different and will demonstrate a clear incapacity on the part of power structures to prevent and react in the face of the crisis of industrial society. This is not surprising, as the entire existence of the elites will be jeopardised, isolated as they already are and obstinate in their own world. They will not make decisions that benefit society as a whole since this would imply a dramatic change in the policies that go against their own interests and inertias. Rather, they will try to intensify those same policies. Despite the fact that such policies (large-scale empowerment, urbanisation, speed, specialisation and competition) adapted well in the ascending phase, this bid for continuity will lead to a greater deterioration in living, institutional and environmental conditions, and a possible orderly transition will be replaced by a more abrupt collapse (García, 2008; Heinberg 2007 and 2009). This will probably be the scenario that we must confront around 2030, when the world situation will worsen, particularly after the definitive breakdown of global capitalism and the beginning of the progressive disintegration of the different ‘regional planetary capitalisms’, while the energy and ecological crises worsen and climate change deepens. By that date there will be a significant exhaustion of fossil fuels, something that will become even worse around 2050, because of an abrupt fall in available supplies of coal (Heinberg, 2009).

### Yes Collapse---Wall

#### Peak oil = collapse

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

The systemic crisis has therefore entered a phase of progressive breakdown and geopolitical re-composition that will lead to the financial, economic and socio-political decomposition of global capitalism. Peak Oil will herald a permanent and abrupt fall in global economic growth and a collapse of the world financial system as we know it.

#### Financial instability = cap collapse inevitable

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

The most fragile link of global capitalism is its financial dimension, although this may appear to be its most powerful, and in the interests of which everything must be sacrificed. In fact, the main central states have dedicated significant amounts of money, obtained by issuing debt, or through monetary mechanisms, to save their financial systems and to contain in whatever way possible the depreciation of assets of all types (equities, real estate, financial). A true global financial coup! And global capitalism has managed, momentarily, despite nearly des- troying itself in the attempt, and above all by razing the social order, or its remains, to pay exorbitant interest for the debt that has been borrowed. In this way, the financial-corporate world has managed to move ahead, in some cases becoming more concentrated and taking on greater global scope.

#### Lack of growth = collapse of capitalism

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

However, the onset of energy decline implies a deepening of the systemic crisis. Instead of ‘creative destruction’ we are about to witness ‘destructive destruction’, for the first time in the history of capitalism, in particular since the industrial revolution. The industrial revolution produced another revolution – the financial revolution. The private banks loan more money than they possess, thus generating money based on debt, and this does not raise any ‘problem’ if the economy is in constant growth. But if this premise is not fulfilled (beyond a cer- tain time), the system collapses. This is particularly true if a persistent economic decline takes hold, a decline that has no end, as is expected (Heinberg, 2006). It is even more certain as regards current global capitalism, highly financialised and deregulated as it is, and based on a pyramid of endless debt.

### A2 No Collapse for Developing World

#### Collapse is inevitable for developing countries too

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

However, the collapse in the centres will differ from that in the peripheries, as we are already observing. Emerging states such as China, India and Brazil are experiencing a significant growth rate, while in the Western world, the United States, the EU and Japan have ground to a halt or have entered a recession. But let us not be deceived! Global capitalism operates as one, as a giant, complex, interdependent and conflictive puzzle, and we cannot understand one piece separate from the others. Moreover, it is not possible that one survives alone if the others enter into crisis. This is also true for the newly emerging centres (China and India, for example). How will they emerge without a major consumer like the United States, which up to recently has fuelled the world economy? – likewise if the consumer demands of the EU drop abruptly? And how can these countries emerge powerfully without the raw material and energy resources that are necessary for their operation? Furthermore, the two new giants, China and India, are quickly consuming their best and most accessible coal reserves (which they depend on for more than 70 per cent of raw energy). This will decisively affect their efforts to maintain high growth rates in the future (Heinberg, 2009). The same can be said about the consequences of the current rising price of oil, which could bring the global recovery that has been underway since 2010 to a halt, leading to higher inflation and interest rates, as well as making investment of all types more expensive. Heinberg in his latest book, The End of Growth (2011, at press), tells us how continuous growth has come to an end, even though there are still relatively significant expansions in some parts of the world, based above all on global capitalism, supported by the main states. Without such assisted capitalism, growth would have already come to an end. And, if it continues, the recent and steep increase in the cost of crude oil could be the definitive, final blow. Thus the deepening of the global crisis will be manifested in un- equal ways across the world and its worsening and eventual impact will depend to a great extent on the availability of energy and natural resources, as well as the way different societies are preparing to confront the energy decline, and equally their greater or lesser vulnerability in the face of the world energy crisis. However, it is important to under- line here that global capitalism is principally a series of world power relationships - e.g. emissions of international money, world commercial flows, the global and state institutional framework, hierarchical military power, energy control, regulation of the labour force and migratory currents. It is all on the verge of experiencing very serious mutations. In fact these have already begun, although in an underground fashion that will soon burst through to the surface.

### Transition Possible

#### But solutions are possible

Duran 12 [(Ramón Fernández, founding member of Ecologistas en Acción, reference for grassroots social movements) “The Breakdown of Global Capitalism: 2000-2030” Ecologistas en Accion (Libros en Acción), Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), Transnational Institute (TNI)] AT

But when the structure of world power (first) and regional power (later) begins to crack and crumble, producing very harsh conditions for humanity, there will also be new possibilities to empower, in particular from below, transforming and emancipating solutions, solutions that were previously very difficult to propose, manage and realise. These will not be easy solutions, but by then it will be more feasible that they can progress and proliferate in the face of an absence of institutional responses. Such solutions are possible if we manage to reach that temporal horizon in the best possible conditions, having sown the necessary seeds that could then prosper, changing the correlations of power. If not, the future will be even harsher and the collapse of industrial civilisation even more abrupt. These solutions would be much easier to carry out within the complexity that is implied in (even mi- nimally) democratic environments with ‘alive’ societies than in heavily repressive, ‘dead’ societies. The situation will be particularly delicate in highly modernised (‘overdeveloped’) spaces as these will be the most affected by the progressive collapse of industrial civilisation, above all in highly urbanised or industrialised territories that consume more than three-quarters of world energy: this applies especially to central spaces, but also to the more dynamic areas of the major emerging actors. The less modernised (‘underdeveloped’) spaces, more rural, less industrialised, less technological, spaces that consume fewer resources and are more autonomous, will be in a much better position in the face of the long decline. This applies to some 2 billion people in the peasant farmer world and some 400 million in the indigenous worlds of the planet (Mander, 2007), worlds that help ‘cool down the planet’ and in general use the biomass as an energy source. Furthermore, these worlds will no longer have the enormous pressure they currently experience from modernised society in its relentless expansion, an expansion that is not only physical and institutional but also cultural. It is because vernacular societies have adapted their way of life to the environment that they are to a great extent sustainable. Conversely, it is because industrial society makes an effort to adapt the environment to its way of life that this society cannot survive, above all when it attempts to go beyond the limits of ecological capacity on a global scale (Goldsmith, 1993). Throughout the next two decades we will probably see a progressive brake on urbanisation processes, but not a return to the rural world – at least not on a massive scale. This will be the case even if living conditions in urban-metropolitan spaces deteriorate intensely, an inescapable fact. The urban-metropolitan inertias are very strong. There is a great deal of capital invested in these highly modernised spaces and there are no alternatives outside of them for the population that has turned to them en masse. These populations have been pushed towards the huge cities, expelled by processes of modernisation and ransacking in the rural world, and have been attracted by opportuni- ties, riches and glamour; and like Cortes they have ‘burned their ships’ along the way There is therefore no easy return. Moreover, the countryside now has fences everywhere, something that is compounded by an increasing appropriation of farm land on the part of the main states and major corporations. All of this means that rural–urban conflicts will proliferate. However, as the current forms of property and power are eroded, new possibilities will emerge of social recovery from the progressive privatisation of goods that up to now has been widely practised. This recovery will depend on the degree of organisation and social and environmental awareness that societies have at that point. It is important to remember that in the past the crisis of power institutions has not normally given rise to the most equitable types of societies, and therefore it is also probable that the era of the deple- tion of fossil fuels could be even more despotic than the era of their abundance (Los Amigos de Ludd, 2007) – initially at least.

#### Here’s the alternative

Ahmed 11 [(Nafeez, international security analyst, runs a think-tank called the Institute for Policy Research and Development) “The Crisis of Civilization” Documentary, published 2011. Text from subtitles, accessible on http://crisisofcivilization.com/] AT

What I am seeing, really is that a lot of the mainstream, conventional thinking is not self-reflective enough; there isn't enough capacity to look at what we've done wrong. What have we done at our societies that isn't working? that needs to change? There's not enough willingness to accept that maybe the path that we've gone on hasn't been optimal, hasn't been the best way for humanity ever. Welcome to the world of tomorrow! Climb aboard." You are about to take a journey our of this world, into the world of the future. Forget the world around you. Forget the people around you." You are entering Futurama. Alone with yout own thoughts." These crises really, in a way, are symptoms of a process of transition. Transition to another form of civilisation, another form of social, political, and economic, and cultural organisation. I think the urgent question that we need to be asking ourselves is "What comes after?" What is the post carbon, post peak world going to look like? And that is really up to us. It's pretty clear that we cannot continue growing on a single planet, endlessly. What this means is that if we are going to overcome these crises, we need to rethink our whole understanding of the human condition. And our relationship to the environment, and our relationship to one another. And that we need to move away from some of these prevailing ideas and values that have dominated our current drive towards unlimited material growth, which has been driven by these consumerist values to do with the idea that human wellbeing is linked to increasing consumption of material products, and increasing acquisition of material goods. So, do we need to ditch the whole concept of growth? Well, I do think that we need to reject the material concept of unlimited economic growth. But we can still retain the idea of social progress, that there is some kind of moving forward. But we need to redefine what we mean by moving forward, by getting better, by advancing. Rather than defining this in material terms, in terms of material production and consumption. We need to be defining it in terms of meeting people's basic needs. Recognising that any kind of material progress that we might make in and of itself means nothing. if it doesn't cater for these more fundamental goals that all of us hold to be so important. Things like having clean water, education, literacy, things like spiritual fulfillment, things like community, family, things like wellbeing. There may be some material components to that, but what we find is that the material conditions of life rather than being the fundamental goal rather those are simply tools to achieve these much more important values. Jimmy!" Don't be frightened! We are your friends."

#### More specific alt

Ahmed 11 [(Nafeez, international security analyst, runs a think-tank called the Institute for Policy Research and Development) “The Crisis of Civilization” Documentary, published 2011. Text from subtitles, accessible on http://crisisofcivilization.com/] AT

We need to accept that the overabundance of fossil fuels has been linked to the ability to continue on this path of unlimited growth. there are many viable alternatives to fossil fuels. There is solar energy, wind energy, geothermal energy. As we've discussed, scaling up this process of transitioning to renewable energy infrastructure wouldn't be feasible, so we need to be recognising that there should be more localisation, that there needs to be much less consumption of natural resources, that we need to be lowering our footprint on the Earth. Renewable energy alternatives do not allow us to continue business as usual. What they allow us to do is to contract our societies to a form which is much more sustainable and much more in parity with the environment and the Earth. Out of the silent darkness it comes to inflict its life destroying poison on the careless, the unwary, the unprotected." No sain person would deliverately expose himself to its venom. No intelligent person would venture within striking distance of its fangs." Yet, today, young people are floating with the poison every bit as deadly as that of the snake." I think certainly the way forward for looking at the banks is, at a minimum, we want to see a fundamental separation. Of the activities, of the financial sector, where banks are investing and speculating on stock markets, and shares, and so on and so forth and we have this fictional financial wall wind going on; separate that out from basic retail banking, where a person goes to the bank, deposits their money for safe keeping, and goes away. They want to know that their money is their money and that banks aren't going to be playing around with that and it's going to be in jeopardy. That's one thing. On the other hand, we need to completely rethink the way money is created in the first place by banks. We need to accept that interst hasn't worked, it's actually generated and fundamentally created this whirlwind of unrepayable debt. Which leads to cyclical economic failures. We need to be looking at the entire way that banks are structured and their money is created and to start thinking about fundamental alternatives that communities can start engaging in now. What we're talking about is creating new forms of currency, new forms of exchange and making them much more in parity with the real world. One of the most significant key structural problems is the fact that the vast majority of the world's population lives in a state of dispossession. By dispossession I mean that they do not have access, or ownership, or use rights for land, resources, raw materials. This condition is one of the key causes that has generated a lot of the most regressive dynamics of capitalism in its current form. So, it's essential that we challenge this condition of dispossession fundamentally. Communities are going to have to have access to land to produce food. If they don't then, they're not going to be able to eat because supply chains are going to be damaged as a result of peak oil. Fossil fuels will not be providing food in the way that we were able to do so in the past. Industrial agriculture is failing. So, in the post peak world we need to be exploring new forms of social organisation that allow communities to open up access to land, to resources, to the commons. And certainly we need to have a dialogue about how this happens. I am not saying that I have a simple answer or a blueprint for the way forward. But this is something that needs to emerge organically, from communities themselves. It's important to recognise that existing institutions and structures are more than likely to doggedly pursue their own vested interests. Even as this accelerates global crises. But this just means that it is absolutely essential for us, as communities to become much more resilient to these shocks. We're going to have to become much more localised, participatory, and grassroots, in how we do things like food, energy, and the economy. And this is going to be essential for us, not just to prosper, but to survive.

### RoB

#### Pedagogy is key

Carr 11 [(Paul R. Carr, Lakehead University (Orillia) Brad J. Porfilio, Lewis University) “The Obama Education Files: Is There Hope to Stop the Neoliberal Agenda in Education?” Journal of Inquiry & Action in Education, 4(1), 2011] AT

We have chosen to highlight neoliberalism’s impact on education because we believe that modern, progressive, highly-functioning societies need a broadly responsive, socially relevant, socially just, and pedagogically-engaged educational system, one that bolsters and cultivates critical teaching and learning, accepting that knowledge is socially constructed and mediated (Kincheloe, 2008c). As a starting-point, we accept Friere’s contention that education is, and needs to be understood as, a political project (Freire, 1973). Our interest in critical pedagogy helps us elaborate a conceptual framework of analysis, and to identify the potential for transformation within schools and society, a connection that we believe is fluid and necessarily complex (see Kincheloe’s body of work, including 2008a, 2008b, 2008c). Ultimately, we believe that there is a link, as others have pointed out, including John Dewey decades ago, between education and democracy (Ayers, 2009; Carr, 2010; Giroux, 2009; Porfilio & Carr, 2008). Thus, the spectacular victory of the first African-American to become President of the United States, which was hailed by the media as well as the world, has been seen as a watershed moment in the political and historical development of not only the US but all nations. Given the dearth of critical analysis in relation to Obama’s leadership and his administration’s educational agenda, which we contend is fundamental to meaningful democratic development, we examine herein the meaning of potential transformation in and through the Obama administration’s approach to education.

### 1AR Scranton

#### An Uncivilizing mode of thought is key – one that accepts that our civilization has already died – this is the only way to address destruction of the environment

Scranton 13 [(Roy Scranton's scholarship and essays have been published in Contemporary Literature, Theory & Event, the New York Times, Boston Review; co-editor of Fire and Forget: Short Stories from the Long War, an anthology of literary fiction by veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan; PhD candidate in English at Princeton University.) “Learning How to Die in the Anthropocene” NYT November 10, 2013] AT

Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and species extinction give rise to profound problems that humanities scholars and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might seem remarkably ill suited to address. After all, how will thinking about Kant help us trap carbon dioxide? Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans? Of course not. But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?” In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — “What does my life mean in the face of death?” — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end? These questions have no logical or empirical answers. They are philosophical problems par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization. Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea. Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole. “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me. I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.” I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies failed to move quickly enough, and volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in to manage disaster relief. Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad. I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world. Our new home. The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end. Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence. The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead. The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality. The choice is a clear one. We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear. If we want to learn to live in the Anthropocene, we must first learn how to die.

### Mythos Good

#### Myth is key – it provides meaning to lives that are currently devoid of it and allows us to change the world

Katarina 12 [“Poetic Fireflies - The Revelatory Luminosity of Myths” Divine Virtuosity, Musings on the Art and Philosophy of Good Life, Jan 25] AT

Myth is an attempt to narrate a whole human experience, of which the purpose is too deep, going too deep in the blood and soul, for mental explanation or description. David Herbert Lawrence Fantasists, whether they use the ancient archetypes of myth and legend or the younger ones of science and technology, may be talking as seriously as any sociologist – and a good deal more directly – about human life as it is live, and as it might be lived, and as it ought to be lived. For after all, as great scientist have said and as all children know, it is above all by the imagination that we achieve perception, and compassion, and hope. Ursula K. Le Guin The great fantasies, myths and tales are indeed like dreams: they speak from the unconscious to the unconscious, in the language of the unconscious – symbol and archetype. Though they use words, they work the way music does: they short-circuit verbal reasoning, and go straight to the thoughts that lie too deep to utter. They cannot be translated fully into the language of reason, but only a Logical Positivist, who also finds Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony meaningless, would claim that they are therefore meaningless. They are profoundly meaningful, and usable – practical – in terms of ethics; of insight; of growth. Ursula K. Le Guin Myth is not what we most readily - most facilely, and typically abstractly - take it to be: "exotic stories" from cultures unlike ours. Myth is a mode of culture itself, which precipitated those stories and gave them their power and form over the mode of mentality or personality to which it is a historical-psychological correlate. Myth is a way of being, a mode or dimension of subjectivity, an organic system of concretely grasped value principles concentrating the meaning of human life into a pre-philosophical metaphor, a nuclear parable or potent allegory: we recognize it in primitive or premodern peoples, we see it briefly in the sparkling imagination and spiritual life of children, before our distinctive modern culture crushes their morale and introduces them to the prison of compulsively literalizing ways of seeing things, the prevailing prosaic, banal, fact-ridden existence to which literalized and abstractivized mentalities can of course see no alternative. Moderns know myth, as they know anything, only as what they have dissected it into, what they have "scienced" or intellectualized. Kenneth Smith Myth is the practical metabolism of our soulish life, the logic of our obsessions and oversights for which we have no language or code. Myth is the "morality" that the ineffable puts upon us, our unaccountable imperatives, our inexplicably selective clarity and obscurity, the mortal one-sidedness of our talents and wits, the passion and apathy that make such a transient passage through our hapless minds; that weave a pattern of fatality others will see before we do. Myth is distinctively human or sublime higher-order instinct, the "reason" in culture that reason knows not of. Kenneth Smith Art or culture or philosophy must ply its genius today against this most prodigious opponent in all of history - human self-obliviousness, man's deific powers of denial and delusion, the nescience buried in the heart of science. Art must keen its scalpel for one sure incision, it must razor the bladder of an inflationary corpus of hypertrophic beliefs so deftly that the violence is only felt after the fact. Delusion must be lanced like a boil bloated to purple distension: art is not the play of pretty illusions - entertainment is that whoring pastime - but rather righteous and wise disillusion, judicious severing of a malignancy. Art is far from amoral; it is in crusade against lying and trivializing conventional morality and must transcend that snake pit of corruption, certainly; but amoral it is not, in no way is it free to be neutral and objective. Art is either the lancet of a higher truth, a law superior to any of man's pleasant and flattering rhetorical reasonings, or else it has no authority, no right to command anyone's attention. Art traffics with the divine, that is, the hidden or occult, the mythic, which is after all of the very essence of man, the stuff his character and even his life are ultimately woven from. A wise society knows to have contempt for egomaniacal poseurs playing onanistically with art supplies, and a foolish society imagines that "art is whatever artists may do." Kenneth Smith Myth is the quintessence or ultimate archetype of intuitive / right-brained / gnosic / creative thinking: it is the paradigmatic concentration, application, task, teleology, and mode of energy of this kind of figurative or concretizing thinking, that seeks to make truth "graphic" or palpable, revelatory or feelingly authoritative rather than just permitting it to dissipate and be volatilized into one-sidedly abstract terminology and ideas. Myth is a strategy of analogical and metaphoric truthmongering, related to the concept that medieval philosophy of rhetoric (John of Salisbury e.g.) called "eloquence," the truth put in its most persuasive form. Myth is not petty truth but truth in a grand mode, it ruptures the artificial apparatus of false distinctions and dysrelations, the conventional or doxic septa that separate organically related issues from one another: myth is the infinitization of the finitized world-order that ordinarizing or mediocritizing intellect/ego has perpetrated all across society (modern society most especially). Myth makes truth whole-mindedly experienceable rather than schematically or formalistically skeletalized and arid, bled white of all the energies of life. In the warfare between what the Old Testament calls the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, myth is knowledge fighting on the side of life, against the "deathworks" of nihilistic consciousness and science. Kenneth Smith "Intellect" seems to itself the whole universe of conceivable possibilities and in this way and for this reason it rejoices over its liberation from the narrow or myopic cosmos of intuition, the feeling-life within which animals and infants and idiots are bound. But just as there are physically vocalizable sounds that are not contained in the English alphabet, and difficult/unnatural/alien combinations of letters (diphthongs and consonantal blends) that English does not like or permit, and foreign or other-cultural comprehensions of experiences and concepts that are not able to be translated or framed in terms congenial to Englished and modernized and bourgeoisified mentalities, so too there are qualitative energies and energetically blended relations and flavors of meaning that are utterly lost in the transformation of personality from the mode of intuition to the mode of intellect. Abstractivist mentality of course never MISSES anything that has dropped out or been edited from its more primitive to its more sophisticated ("rational," "conscious") modalities. Myth - as a modality of mind to which the entire superstructure of mythos-culture is anchored, and out of which its cosmos of concepts and reasons and purposes is elaborated - is one of the most fertile and prodigious of these "logically" eclipsed or dethroned world-forces. What "culture" is and what values it is harnessed to, and what ultimate range of personality-types it subserves, is radically transfigured from mythos- to logos-culture. Kenneth Smith The poet of today ...is profoundly inhibited by the dearth of shared consciousness of myth. Our current motivating ideas are not myths but ideologies, lacking transcendental significance. This loss of myth-consciousness I believe to be the most devastating loss that humanity can suffer; for ... myth-consciousness is the bond that unites men both with one another and with the unplumbed Mystery from which mankind is sprung and without reference to which the radical significance of things goes to pot. Now a world bereft of radical significance is not long tolerated; it leaves me radically unstable, so that they will seize at any myth or pseudo-myth that is offered. Philip Wheelwright It helps to regard soul as an active intelligence, forming and plotting each person’s fate. Translators use “plot” to render the ancient Greek word mythos in English. The plots that entangle our souls and draw forth our characters are the great myths. That is why we need a sense of myth and knowledge of different myths to gain insight into our epic struggles, our misalliances, and our tragedies. Myths show the imaginative structures inside our messes, and our human characters can locate themselves against the background of the characters of myth. James Hillman One is almost tempted to say that the language itself is a mythology deprived of its vitality, a bloodless mythology so to speak, which has only preserved in a formal and abstract form what mythology contains in living and concrete form. Friedrich Schelling I used to read the myths of love Now I have become the mythical lover Rumi I believe imagination is stronger than knowledge - that myth is more potent than history. I believe that dreams are more powerful than facts - That hope always triumphs over experience - That laughter is the only cure for grief. And I believe that love is stronger than death. Robert Fulghum True myths may serve for thousands of years as an inexhaustible source of intellectual speculation, religious joy, ethical inquiry, and artistic renewal. The real mystery is not destroyed by reason. The fake one is. You look at it and it vanishes. You look at the Blonde Hero--really look--and he turns into a gerbil. But you look at Apollo, and he looks back at you. The poet Rilke looked at a statue of Apollo about fifty years ago, and Apollo spoke to him. "You must change your life," he said. When the true myth rises into consciousness, that is always its message. You must change your life. Ursula K. Le Guin Just as the introduction of the irrational numbers ... is a convenient myth [which] simplifies the laws of arithmetic ... so physical objects are postulated entities which round out and simplify our account of the flux of existence... The conceptional scheme of physical objects is [likewise] a convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth and yet containing that literal truth as a scattered part. Willard Van Orman Quine Mythology is the womb of man's initiation to life and death. Joseph Campbell The role of the artist I now understood as that of revealing through the world-surfaces the implicit forms of the soul, and the great agent to assist the artist was the myth. Joseph Campbell The myth is the public dream and the dream is the private myth. If your private myth, your dream, happens to coincide with that of the society, you are in good accord with your group. If it isn't, you've got an adventure in the dark forest ahead of you. Joseph Campbell Today the function of the artist is to bring imagination to science and science to imagination, where they meet, in the myth. Cyril Connolly All the great legends are Templates for human behavior. I would define a myth as a story that has survived. John Boorman Each religion, by the help of more or less myth, which it takes more or less seriously, proposes some method of fortifying the human soul and enabling it to make its peace with its destiny. George Santayana Each time, storytellers clothed the naked body of the myth in their own traditions, so that listeners could relate more easily to its deeper meaning. Joan D. Vinge For the myth is the foundation of life; it is the timeless schema, the pious formula into which life flows when it reproduces its traits out of the unconscious. Thomas Mann If science fiction is the mythology of modern technology, then its myth is tragic. Ursula K. Le Guin The point of mythology or myth is to point to the horizon and to point back to ourselves: This is who we are; this is where we came from; and this is where we're going. And a lot of Western society over the last hundred years - the last 50 years really - has lost that. We have become rather aimless and wandering. J. Michael Straczynski To try to write a grand cosmical drama leads necessarily to myth. To try to let knowledge substitute ignorance in increasingly larger regions of space and time is science. Hannes Alfven We each have a personal myth, a vision of who we really are and what we want. Health means that part of what you want is to give to others. George Weinberg We can keep from a child all knowledge of earlier myths, but we cannot take from him the need for mythology. Carl Gustav Jung Myths are clues to the spiritual potentialities of the human life. Joseph Campbell Myths and creeds are heroic struggles to comprehend the truth in the world. Ansel Adams Old myths, old gods, old heroes have never died. They are only sleeping at the bottom of our mind, waiting for our call. We have need for them. They represent the wisdom of our race. Stanley Kunitz The poem is a little myth of man's capacity of making life meaningful. And in the end, the poem is not a thing we see - it is, rather, a light by which we may see-and what we see is life. Robert Penn Warren Myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an inflection. Roland Barthes Myth is the hidden part of every story, the buried part, the region that is still unexplored because there are as yet no words to enable us to get there. Myth is nourished by silence as well as by words. Italo Calvino … myths and mythology wasn't to give meaning to life but to give us an experience of life, an experience of vitality in being alive. Joseph Campbell Mythologies, in other words, mythologies and religions, are great poems and, when recognized as such, point infallibly through things and events to the ubiquity of a “presence” or “eternity” that is whole and entire in each. In this function all mythologies, all great poetries, and all mystic traditions are in accord; and where any such inspiriting vision remains effective in a civilization, every thing and every creature within its range is alive. Joseph Campbell There is nothing truer than myth: history, in its attempt to realize myth, distorts it, stops halfway; when history claims to have succeeded, this is nothing but humbug and mystification. Everything we dream is realizable. Reality does not have to be: it is simply what it is. Eugene Ionesco Sometimes legends make reality, and become more useful than the facts. Salman Rushdie Myths are about the human struggle to deal with the great passages of time and life - birth, death, marriage, the transitions from childhood to adulthood to old age. They meet a need in the psychological or spiritual nature of humans that has absolutely nothing to do with science. To try to turn a myth into a science, or a science into a myth, is an insult to myths, an insult to religion, and an insult to science. In attempting to do this, creationists have missed the significance, meaning, and sublime nature of myths. They took a beautiful story of creation and re-creation and ruined it. Michael Shermer How should we be able to forget those ancient myths that are at the beginning of all people, the myths about dragons that at the last moment turn into princesses; perhaps all the dragons of our lives are princesses who are only waiting to see us once beautiful and brave. Perhaps everything terrible is in its deepest being something helpless that wants help from us. Rainer Maria Rilke It is, therefore, a mistake to regard myth as an inferior mode of thought, which can be cast aside when human beings have attained the age of reason. Mythology is not an early attempt at history, and does not claim that its tales are objective fact. Like a novel, an opera or a ballet, myth is make-believe; it is a game that transfigures our fragmented, tragic world, and helps us to glimpse new possibilities by asking 'what if?' - a question which has also provoked some of our most important discoveries in philosophy, science and technology. Karen Armstrong Myth is, after all, the never-ending story. Joan D. Vinge

#### Mythos is important to philosophy

Wilson [(James Matthew Wilson is an Assistant Professor at Villanova University) “Logos Severed from Mythos: The Consequences of Our Forgetting” Anamnesis Journal 2012] AT

In my essay, “Retelling the Story of Reason,” I contended that modern thought routinely sets logos, (reason) in opposition with mythos (story-telling), and favors logos. This habit breeds an unhappy myth of its own: mankind was once subject to the vague powers of myth, but has emerged triumphant from such antiquated miasma into the knowing precisions of a rational age. While such a myth gained traction in the modern age, particularly during the Enlightenment, its basic form dates back to Plato. Or rather, it dates back to a certain reading of Plato. My essay called that reading into question, returning to some of Plato’s best-known statements on the “ancient quarrel” between poetry and philosophy, in order to show that, for Plato, stories serve as the condition of possibility for reasoning and mythos naturally and properly interweaves with logos. While Plato certainly distinguishes between the two, his writing provides us ample reason to acknowledge that distinction as subsisting within a natural unity. If Plato is to be believed, the philosopher must reason both in stories and through them, so that sound reasoning might itself be understood as a kind of story-telling. I built upon this account of Plato to advance three arguments in favor of a modern reunion of mythos and logos. Plato himself provides resources for such a reunion, but so does the classicist and theorist of myth, Marcel Detienne. In a loose reading of Detienne, we might say that the modern separation between logos and mythos has its origin in the methodologies of the classical Greek historians. If we can get behind this division, which Detienne critiques as an ideological contingency rather than a conceptual necessity, we shall find that logos and mythos were once synonymous. If Detienne is correct, then pace Herodotus and his descendants, we have good reason to believe that story-telling is a kind of reasoning, reasoning is a kind of story-telling, and that the prototype of this union is found in an oral culture, where the telling and re-telling of stories serve as a dominant mode of oral reasoning, with its use of interpretation, commentary, and argument. Finally, I consider the Christian-Platonist tradition’s understanding of man as an intellectual animal, whose intellect is by nature ordered to the knowledge of being. In its highest function, the intellect sees the form of beings: as Plato and the Greeks understood, when the truth is fully present to us, it no longer hides within a mere “image” or lingers as discursive definition, but shows forth as its form. If stories are incontestably “forms,” then to see the form of a story must be a kind of rational vision: to see the form of a story may entail a vision of the intellect that bypasses the plodding methods of discursive logic but is nonetheless rational. These ideas from Plato, Detienne, and classical epistemology argue for a reunion of logos and mythos, and culminate, in my essay, in four theses proposing some positive consequences that might result from it. First, rejoining mythos and logos would further the recognition that all reason is conditioned by the narrative in which it takes place, and yet would not necessarily compromise the integrity of reason that has led to a fashionable historicism among contemporary thinkers. Second, narrative should be admissible as a fundamental part of reasoning, and so we must find a way to articulate that admission in terms other than that of the mere gratuitous example. Third, by admitting mythos and logos as distinct modes of rational inquiry, we effectively relativize both. This, in turn, may foreground the ultimate terms of philosophy: the intellect that sees and the form of being seen. How the reason arrives at the form of truth is a mere matter of method, but it is the vision of truth made present in the soul that truly matters. Fourth, the intellectual life should itself be understood as a particularly excellent form of life-story. Having excised story-telling from philosophy, we have sacrificed on the altar of logical method the philosopher as human being and philosophy as a way of life. Having established the possible benefits of a reintegration of mythos and logos in the reflections that follow, I would like to outline some consequences of our forgetting their interrelation. As I note, “Retelling,” explored mythos and logos as representative of the foundation and manifestation of reason in Plato. Following Detienne, I proposed that they are two terms nearly synonymous, differing chiefly in the oral or written context of reasoning they suggest Finally, I contended that if the reason’s search for the knowledge of reality culminates in the vision of truth in the soul, then, in seeking the truth, the intellect sees the form of all things, including the forms of human lives composed as stories; for this, I argued with the aid of the works of Jacques Maritain and St. Augustine. I turn now to the consequences of this forgetting of logos and mythos’ near identity, and begin by observing the rather “literary” revenge mythos has taken on logos. As soon as modern philosophy excluded story-telling from its methodological city, that very human practice reasserted itself precisely as an irrational or illogical form of knowing. While there are historical instances of this reassertion of story-telling (or poetry’s) claim to truth dating back to the age of Plato, in the poets of the Italian renaissance, in Shakespeare, Pascal, and elsewhere, we see it most forcefully in the romanticism inaugurated by Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). There, in a trope typical to his century, abstract “metaphysics” gets unfavorably contrasted with the concrete, morally-binding realities Burke believed we could know only by means of the lived drama of social life. What Russell Kirk would theorize as the “moral imagination,” Burke understood as a refusal of abstract ratiocination and as an immersion of the humane sentiments in the dramatic forms of human events, which are informed with meaning through the weight of ancestry and posterity. While Burke himself does not reduce moral knowledge to the feelings, his vocabulary lends itself to just such an anti-intellectualist position.1 As such, truth becomes dramatic to the exclusion of abstract discourse. Truth comes to reside in the ghetto of the heart, while rationality carries the field by becoming a bloody yet bloodless automaton.((Cf. Pascal, 78; Sec. 277.)) Such a literary revenge of story-telling seems destined to occupy Burke’s historical position: that of the prophetic cry of a sensibility largely ignored by the mechanics of a confident modern rationalism. Mythos claims to have comprehension of a kind of truth to which reason has no access, but, to the extent such claims are entertained, they are kept to the margins, sometimes lamented, more frequently ignored. Thirty years ago, Alasdair MacIntyre made clear a related consequence of the divorce of logos and mythos, in After Virtue (1981). MacIntyre contended that all ethical arguments become interminable and incommensurable unless they can occur in the context of a community’s reflections on the nature of the human telos, that is, on the form of the achieved good life for man. To draw speculative pictures of what a good human life looks like requires being able to talk in terms of stories; and, indeed, the “raw data” prerequisite to such speculation about possible good lives consists not of the atomized events of a human life or of abstract propositions about moral right, but rather of formed accounts of entire lives. We need the capacity to interpret human life as a story in order to ask meaningfully how we ought to live. And while we retain this capacity ineluctably in virtue of human life’s finite story form, MacIntyre rightly notes that modern ethics since Hume has refused the admissibility of narrative to rational argument.2 The criteria we actually follow in determining how to live has perversely been excluded from the formal philosophical discipline dedicated to living well. Because of this, a modern person may be moral, but he cannot think ethically. This ethical impasse relates directly to an intellectual one—another consequence. In the ancient world, philosophy was a way of life, just as the religious life has been in the Christian era.3 It was natural that so much of philosophy should be concerned with, and should appear in the form of, stories in order to represent what the life of a philosopher properly looks like. Because man was seen to be a rational animal, his true happiness could only be experienced by those with the capacity to dedicate themselves to the cultivation of the intellect. The life of the philosopher was that of a man drawn by his own love toward the lasting intellectual fulfillment that, sustained, alone constitutes human happiness. The quest to come to a vision of the good, and the life of contemplation made possible thereafter, was not measurable in terms of its hard, exacting method but only in terms of the kind of joy it made possible. To advert once more to Plato, we may say that while it is easy to distinguish the philosophy of Socrates from the character of Socrates, one misunderstands the nature of the dialogues in doing so. They are bound together as idea and manifestation, or, rather, premise and demonstration.

### Mythos Ev---Deconstruction

#### Instead we should recognize that we will never understand the other and constantly question our confidence in meaning – this recognition is the only system immune to deconstruction, indicating that the aff’s ethics are impossible; and solves the violence that their framework commits us to

MacDonald, 1999 (Department of Political Studies, Queens University, 1999, Eleanor Science & Society 63.2)

In an unusually direct moment in his article, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority'," Derrida makes the statement, “deconstruction is justice” (Derrida, 1992, 15). The question of the relationship between deconstruction and politics returns continuously to this claim. It also, of necessity, begs the question of what then is “deconstruction.” In Spectra: of Marx, Derrida describes deconstruction as ‘a motif.“ As well, in a comparison with Marxist philosophy he suggests that what he is doing is “a performative interpretation”: “An interpretation that transforms what it interprets is deﬁnitive of the per-formative as unorthodox with regard to speech act theory as it is with regard to the llth Thesis on Heuerbach (‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however is to dumgeit')" (Derrida, 1994, 51). Elsewhere, in the same text, Derrida uses the term “inﬁnite critique‘ to describe his approach: A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the irreducibility of affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the undeconstructibility of a certain idea of justice. . . . Such a thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable, inﬁnite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. This critique belongs to the movement of an experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is conﬁded, exposed, given up to its waiting for the other and for the event. (Derrida, 1994, 90.) What this experience of ‘inﬁnite critique‘ or this ‘motif’ of de- construction appears as, is a series of maneuvers performed on texts. These maneuvers seem designed to interrupt our conﬁdence in meaning, and in the categories through which we organize meaning, by making these apparent, by playing with them, and by indicating the arbitrariness of their boundaries or oppositions. Deconstructive practices consist in a combination of wordplay, of play on metaphors, of taking things “to extremes,‘ of introducing apparently unrelated texts as parallel to the central one and reading them alongside it, interweaving the multiple texts until meanings become jumbled, and new and unexpected meanings begin to emerge. The overall effect is to unsettle a text, to disturb any straightforward reading of it, to eventually abandon questions about authorial intention, to set the text adrift, as it were. And why is this “justice”? First, because of the "aporia" that it introduces — the sense of confusion that is in fact the "true“ or “honest” and "ethical" response to and perception of the world. I use the word ‘honest’ because what is other is truly other, and therefore ﬁnally unknowable — one is only being honest in an acknowledgment of this. And second, this is “ethical” because categories of meaning, it would seem, are imposed by us, onto others and otherness as a way of ordering, containing, and therefore dominating what is “other to ourselves.” Language is a necessary violence for which deconstruction is the just or ethical response. What is true, then (in the understanding of the world that Derrida provides through deconstruction), is inadequation, non-commensurability, disjointedness. The ethical response is a recognition of this unknowability, a suspicion of all self-certainty. The political response is one of a corresponding openness, a promise of “democracy-to- come” (a promise which Derrida also assures us can never be wholly realizable in the present, in any present). At stake here is the very concept of democracy as concept of a promise that can only arise in such a diastema (failure, inadequation, disjunction, disad- justment, being “out of joint”). That is why we always propose to speak of a democracy to come, not of future democracy in the future present, not even of a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or of a utopia — at least to the extent that their inaccessibility would still retain the temporal form of a future present, of a future modality of a living present. (Derrida, 1994, 64-5.)

### A2 Poems bad

#### Uniqueness goes aff – the lack of poetry represents the shunning of mythos in favor of logos – reinfusing poetry into the classroom is key to emphasize mythos

Simmons 14 [(Andrew, teacher) “Why Teaching Poetry Is So Important” The Atlantic Apr 08] AT

16 years after enjoying a high school literary education rich in poetry, I am a literature teacher who barely teaches it. So far this year, my 12th grade literature students have read nearly 200,000 words for my class. Poems have accounted for no more than 100. This is a shame—not just because poetry is important to teach, but also because poetry is important for the teaching of writing and reading. High school poetry suffers from an image problem. Think of Dead Poet’s Society's scenes of red-cheeked lads standing on desks and reciting verse, or of dowdy Dickinson imitators mooning on park benches, filling up journals with noxious chapbook fodder. There’s also the tired lessons about iambic pentameter and teachers wringing interpretations from cryptic stanzas, their students bewildered and chuckling. Reading poetry is impractical, even frivolous. High school poets are antisocial and effete. I have always rejected these clichéd mischaracterizations born of ignorance, bad movies, and uninspired teaching. Yet I haven’t been stirred to fill my lessons with Pound and Eliot as my 11th grade teacher did. I loved poetry in high school. I wrote it. I read it. Today, I slip scripture into an analysis of The Day of the Locust. A Nikki Giovanni piece appears in The Bluest Eye unit. Poetry has become an afterthought, a supplement, not something to study on its own. In an education landscape that dramatically deemphasizes creative expression in favor of expository writing and prioritizes the analysis of non-literary texts, high school literature teachers have to negotiate between their preferences and the way the wind is blowing. That sometimes means sacrifice, and poetry is often the first head to roll. Yet poetry enables teachers to teach their students how to write, read, and understand any text. Poetry can give students a healthy outlet for surging emotions. Reading original poetry aloud in class can foster trust and empathy in the classroom community, while also emphasizing speaking and listening skills that are often neglected in high school literature classes. Students who don’t like writing essays may like poetry, with its dearth of fixed rules and its kinship with rap. For these students, poetry can become a gateway to other forms of writing. It can help teach skills that come in handy with other kinds of writing—like precise, economical diction, for example. When Carl Sandburg writes, “The fog comes/on little cat feet,” in just six words, he endows a natural phenomenon with character, a pace, and a spirit. All forms of writing benefits from the powerful and concise phrases found in poems. I have used cut-up poetry (a variation on the sort “popularized” by William Burroughs and Brion Gysin) to teach 9th grade students, most of whom learned English as a second language, about grammar and literary devices. They made collages after slicing up dozens of “sources,” identifying the adjectives and adverbs, utilizing parallel structure, alliteration, assonance, and other figures of speech. Short poems make a complete textual analysis more manageable for English language learners. When teaching students to read and evaluate every single word of a text, it makes sense to demonstrate the practice with a brief poem—like Gwendolyn Brooks’s “We Real Cool.” Students can learn how to utilize grammar in their own writing by studying how poets do—and do not—abide by traditional writing rules in their work. Poetry can teach writing and grammar conventions by showing what happens when poets strip them away or pervert them for effect. Dickinson often capitalizes common nouns and uses dashes instead of commas to note sudden shifts in focus. Agee uses colons to create dramatic, speech-like pauses. Cummings of course rebels completely. He usually eschews capitalization in his proto-text message poetry, wrapping frequent asides in parentheses and leaving last lines dangling on their pages, period-less. In “next to of course god america i,” Cummings strings together, in the first 13 lines, a cavalcade of jingoistic catch-phrases a politician might utter, and the lack of punctuation slowing down and organizing the assault accentuates their unintelligibility and banality and heightens the satire. The abuse of conventions helps make the point. In class, it can help a teacher explain the exhausting effect of run-on sentences—or illustrate how clichés weaken an argument. Yet, despite all of the benefits poetry brings to the classroom, I have been hesitant to use poems as a mere tool for teaching grammar conventions. Even the in-class disembowelment of a poem’s meaning can diminish the personal, even transcendent, experience of reading a poem. Billy Collins characterizes the latter as a “deadening” act that obscures the poem beneath the puffed-up importance of its interpretation. In his poem “Introduction to Poetry,” he writes: “all they want to do is tie the poem to a chair with rope/and torture a confession out of it./They begin beating it with a hose/to find out what it really means.” The point of reading a poem is not to try to “solve” it. Still, that quantifiable process of demystification is precisely what teachers are encouraged to teach students, often in lieu of curating a powerful experience through literature. The literature itself becomes secondary, boiled down to its Cliff’s Notes demi-glace. I haven’t wanted to risk that with the poems that enchanted me in my youth. Teachers should produce literature lovers as well as keen critics, striking a balance between teaching writing, grammar, and analytical strategies and then also helping students to see that literature should be mystifying. It should resist easy interpretation and beg for return visits. Poetry serves this purpose perfectly. I am confident my 12th graders know how to write essays. I know they can mine a text for subtle messages. But I worry sometimes if they’ve learned this lesson. In May, a month before they graduate, I may read some poetry with my seniors—to drive home that and nothing more.

### A2 Extinction 1st

#### Prioritize impacts to nature over the survival of the human race – Jeffers:

And when the whole human race

Has been like me rubbed out, they will still be here; storms, moon and ocean,

Dawn and the birds. And I say this: their beauty has more meaning

Than the whole human race and the race of birds.

## Substance Blocks

### A2 War Impact

#### War is an inevitable consequences of the myth of civilization – Jeffers:

These grand and fatal movements toward death: the grandeur of the mass

Makes pity a fool, the tearing pity

For the atoms of the mass, the persons, the victims, makes it seem monstrous

To admire the tragic beauty they build.

It is beautiful as a river flowing or a slowly gathering

Glacier on a high mountain rock-face,

Bound to plow down a forest, or as frost in November,

The gold and flaming death-dance for leaves,

I would burn my right hand in a slow fire

To change the future … I should do foolishly. The beauty of modern

Man is not in the persons but in the

Disastrous rhythm, the heavy and mobile masses, the dance of the

Dream-led masses down the dark mountain.

### Econ

#### The economy’s dead and structural crisis is inevitable – try or die for system wide change

Ahmed 11 [(Nafeez, international security analyst, runs a think-tank called the Institute for Policy Research and Development) “The Crisis of Civilization” Documentary, published 2011. Text from subtitles, accessible on http://crisisofcivilization.com/] AT

One of the areas where we're seeing the feedback effects of different crises is in the economic recession. It's very, very clear that the underlying issue of energy and our ability to sustain economic growth has been dependent on the cheap, widely available abundance of fossil fuels. This goes against the grain neo liberal economy theory, which analyses everything in isolation and doesn't acknowledge that the economy is embedded in the environment, that the economy is embedded in energy sources. Currently, we have a fractional reserve banking system. This system is based on the idea that you have a certain amount of assets in reserve, in your bank and that you have the ability to lend out certain multiples of that asset, in the form of money. So, for example, you have £1 in reserve, you can lend out multiples of eight to ten times the amount that you actually have. What they said in the 1990s is, "This is not enough. We want new ways of making money, we want to be able to lend unlimited amounts." How can we do that?" They said, "Let's have risk assessment models created by banks." And they would assess the levels of risk using these complex computer models. And if you could prove with these quantitative models that your levels of risk were very, very small, they could then justify lending at multiples of thousand times the amounts that you've got in your reserves. And this is what made the whole process of financialisation very, very interesting for capitalists. Because you didn't have to produce anything. You didn't have to produce goods and services anymore. All you had to do was lend money to someone else, who might be making goods and services, or selling a product. And the more you lent them, the more they had to pay you back on compound interst. Obviously, you can see that this system was pretty much unsustainable because the global economy is a closed circle. I mean, how are you going to pay back money that isn't in the system? For you to pay it back, you need to borrow more. And for you to pay it back, you need to produce more. And you need to exploit the environment more, and you need to grow more. So, it accelerated the pressure for unlimited growth. Millions of people use credit to buy the things that add up to a better living." "Well, there sure is a lot of things that I would like to buy for a better living." How about giving me a little credit?" "Nobody gives you credit, John. It's something you have to earn." I don't understand, Mr. Money. How can you earn credit?" "Well, we'll select another channel on the learning machine, by remote control and see." In the late 90s banks were going crazy lending to people. And one of the areas where they were making the biggest profits, was in housing markets and on mortgages, where they were lending to people, who, they knew couldn't pay back, You have good reputation, we know you're reliable." "I am glad you think so." Here is the note and this is where you sign." They were then re-packaging these mortgages as financial products that were safe to invest in and they were selling them on. They were they saying in the case there was a default and that the guy didn't actually pay back the mortgage we'll insure you, so you don't have to worry - it's very, very safe. The guys who were insuring, they did not have any capital either they did not have any moeny to insure and they were taking money in. And it was just this massive bubble it became something like $1.2 quadrillion in size, that's $1000 trillion of virtual money. Compare that to $60 trillion, which was the value of the real world economy. So, what you're seeing is a massive disparity between real life, buying and selling and this virtual financialisation debt bubble. What happened in 2005 to 2008 is that that bubble reached the limits of the energy system. The reality check - that you can't grow infinitely; there is a real world, which is the boundry limit of what you can do. Well, at that point in 2008, when oil supply was dipping and demand was growing that bubble - it's almost as if it was in a box - and it couldn't grow anymore and it just burst. And, at that point the prices rocketed, inflation went through the roof, food crisis went up, cost of living went up obviously oil prices were going up and that was driving the prices of everything else going up. Because of all these factors, people found it incredibly difficult to repay their mortgages. Because mortgages underpinned so much of the growth that was going on in the economy, it was a tipping point that ended up collapsing the whole house of cards. This is the BBC Home Service. Here is the 8 o'clock news." Sir John Ingram speaking of the economic crisis at Worcester last night, warned the prople of Britain to face further cuts in the near future." He stressed the importance of a rigid economy and appealed to everyone to accept the present austerity with fortitude and optimism." A foreign correspondent, commenting on the speech said..." But if you look at how governments are responding, they're not looking at the system and trying to change it. Instead, they're strenghtening and centralising it more. So, who were the first people to suffer? As a consequence of the recession, it was your average consumer, it was your average person on the street. The tax payers, whose money went into a massive bank payout, which was used to cover up the insolvency of the banks. What that did in practice is that it centralised the power of the banks. It gave them the pat on the head that after you guys royally cocked up we're going to pay you some more money, from the tax payers you suffered and meanwhile, by taking that money out of the economy, they actually made things worse. So, you contracted the real economy, the productive economy, where things were needing to happen and you created more business failures, more small business failures, more real economy contraction. At the same time, while these businesses failed, the larger companies, especially the big banks who were now empowered by the massive bailouts that had come in, they started buying up a lot of these other businesses. So, you had a situation, where more centralisation of ownership was also taking place. It's Saturday night, and everyone else is out having fun - it's the best excuse in the world to join the party."

## Theory Frontlines

### Generics

#### Counterinterpretation – the affirmative must be a performance in the direction of the topic or a policy where developing countries prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction – solves all of their offense since it limits the discussion and means the neg gets all of their ground

#### The Krippendorf evidence indicts the ability to draw one stable meaning from the text – this process of trying to figure out the one true interpretation of the resolution assumes an underlying interpretive authority, the imposition of which leads to violence since we dismiss everyone who disagrees as irrational

#### Their interpretation, like ours, is based on a myth, just one that is reinforced by dominant society. Predictable debates get us nowhere, only resisting dominant narratives with our counter-myths can solve and produce productive debate

Richard Delgado, ’92 (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <**Continues**…> Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26 How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies. What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [\*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35 The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37 <continues> I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once-progressive people into harmless technocrats. n70

### State Bad

### Environmental Protection = Policy

### Specific Definitions of RE/EP

### Prioritize/When in Conflict

#### I meet - The 1AC’s poetry was a *direct challenge* to development and resource exploitation to foster in more environmentally conscious modes of thought

### A2 Resolved Definition

Resolved is to reduce by mental analysis,Random House 11 **(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolve)**

### Gov = People

#### Country = the people

Merriam webster’s dictionary

the people of a nation

#### The government = the people

Howard, 2005 (Adam, “Jeffersonian Democracy: Of the People, By the People, For the People,” http://www.byzantinecommunications.com/adamhoward/homework/highschool/jeffersonian.html, 5/27)

Ideally, then, under Jeffersonian Democracy, the government is the people, and people is the government. Therefore, if a particular government ceases to work for the good of the people, the people may and ought to change that government or replace it. Governments are established to protect the people's rights using the power they get from the people.

### No Limits/Fairness

#### Limits are impossible

De Cock 1 (Christian De Cock, Professor of Organizational behaviour, change management, creative problem solving, 2001, “Of Philip K. Dick, reflexivity and shifting realities Organizing (writing) in our post-industrial society” in the book “Science Fiction and Organization”)

'As Marx might have said more generally, 'all that is built or all that is "natural" melts into image' in the contemporary global economies of signs and space' (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 326). The opinion seems to be broadly shared among both academics and practitioners that traditional conceptions of effective organizing and decision-making are no longer viable because we live in a time of irredeemable turbulence and ambiguity (Gergen, 1995). The emerging digital or 'new' economy seems to be a technologically driven vision of new forms of organizing, relying heavily on notions of flexibility as a response this turbulence. Corporate dinosaurs must be replaced with smart networks that add value. Words such as 'cyberspace' 3 and 'cyborganization' drip easily from tongues (e.g. Parker and Cooper, 1998) and 'the organization' becomes more difficult to conceptualize as it 'dissipates into cyberspace' and 'permeates its own boundaries' (Hardy and Clegg 1997: S6). Organizations are losing important elements of permanence as two central features of the modern organization, namely the assumption of self-contained units and its structural solidity, are undermined (March, 1995). Even the concept of place becomes increasingly phantasmagoric as locales get thoroughly penetrated by social influences quite distant from them (Giddens, 1990). In this new organizational world 'reality' seems to have become only a contract, the fabrication of a consensus that can be modified or can break down at any time (Kallinikos, 1997) and the witnessing point - the natural datum or physical reference point - seems to be in danger of being scrapped (Brown, 1997). This notion that reality is dissolving from the inside cannot but be related with feelings of disorientation and anxiety. Casey (1995, pp. 70-1), for example, provides a vivid description of the position of 'the self' within these new organizational realities. This is a world where everyone has lost a sense of everyday competence and is dependent upon experts, where people become dependent on corporate bureaucracy and mass culture to know what to do. The solidity (or absence of it) of reality has of course been debated at great length in the fields of philosophy and social theory, but it remains an interesting fact that organizational scholars have become preoccupied with this issue in recent years. Hassard and Holliday (1998), for example, talk about the theoretical imperative to explore the linkages between fact/fiction and illusion/reality. It is as if some fundamental metaphysical questions have finally descended into the metaphorical organizational street. Over the past decade or so, many academics who label themselves critical management theorists and/or postmodernists (for once, let's not name any names) have taken issue with traditional modes of organizing (and ways of theorizing about this organizing) by highlighting many irrationalities and hidden power issues. These academics have taken on board the idea that language has a role in the constitution of reality and their work is marked by a questioning of the nature of reality, of our conception of knowledge, cognition, perception and observation (e.g. Chia, 1996a; Cooper and Law, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997). Notwithstanding the importance of their contributions, these authors face the problem that in order to condemn a mode of organizing or theorizing they need to occupy an elevated position, a sort of God's eye view of the world; a position which they persuasively challenge when they deconstruct the claims of orthodox/modern organizational analyses (Parker, 2000; Weiskopf and Willmott, 1997). Chia, for example, writes about the radically untidy, ill-adjusted character of the fields of actual experience - 'It is only by … giving ourselves over to the powers of "chaos", ambiguity, and confusion that new and deeper insights and understanding can be attained' (Chia, 1996b, p. 423) - using arguments which could not be more tidy, analytical and precise. This of course raises the issue of reflexivity: if reality can never be stabilized and the research/theorizing process 'is always necessarily precarious, incomplete and fragmented' (Chia, 1996a, p. 54), then Chia's writing clearly sits rather uncomfortably with his ontological and epistemological beliefs. In this he is, of course, not alone (see, e.g., Gephart et al.., 1996; Cooper and Law, 1995). This schizophrenia is evidence of rather peculiar discursive rules where certain ontological and epistemological statements are allowed and even encouraged, but the reciprocate communicational practices are disallowed. Even the people who are most adventurous in their ideas or statements (such as Chia) are still caught within rather confined communicational practices. To use Vickers' (1995) terminology: there is a disjunction between the ways in which organization theorists are ready to see and value the organizational world (their appreciative setting) and the ways in which they are ready to respond to it (their instrumental system). When we write about reflexivity, paradox and postmodernism in organizational analysis, it is expected that we do this unambiguously. 4 And yet, the notion that 'if not consistency, then chaos' is not admitted even by all logicians, and is rejected by many at the frontiers of natural science research - 'a contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166). contradiction causes only some hell to break loose' (McCloskey, 1994, p. 166).

### No Switch-Side

#### The call for switch-side debate for decision-making skills mirrors the technique of the far-right – it occludes mass extinction of life

Kahn 10 (Richard Kahn, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Research at the University of North Dakota, *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement*, 2010, pp. 9-11)

Worse still, though, is that here environmental literacy has not only been co-opted by corporate state forces and morphed into a progressively-styled, touchy-feely method for achieving higher scores on standardized tests like the ACT and SAT, but in an Orwellian turn it has come to stand in actuality for a real illiteracy about the nature of ecological catastrophe, its causes, and possible solutions. As I will argue in this book, our current course for social and environmental disaster (though highly complex and not easily boiled down to a few simple causes or strategies for action) must be traced to the evolution of: an anthropocentric worldview grounded in what the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1993) refers to as a matrix of domination (see chapter 1); a global technocapitalist infrastructure that relies upon market-based and functionalist versions of technoliteracy to instantiate and augment its socioeconomic and cultural control (see chapters 2 and 3); an unsustainable, reductionistic, and antidemocratic model of institutional science (see chapter 4); and the wrongful marginalization and repression of pro-ecological resistance through the claim that it represents a “terrorist” force that is counter to the morals of a democratic society rooted in tolerance, educational change, and civic debate (see chapter 5). By contrast, the environmental literacy standards now showcased at places like the Zoo School as “Hallmarks of Quality” (Archie, 2003, p. 11) are those that consciously fail to develop the type of radical and partisan subjectivity in students, that might be capable of deconstructing their socially and environmentally deleterious hyper-individualism or their obviously socialized identities that tend toward state-sanctioned norms of competition, hedonism, consumption, marketization, and forms of quasi-fascistic patriotism. Just as Stapp (1969) theorized environmental literacy as a form of political moderation that could pacify the types of civic upheaval, that occurred during the Civil Rights era, now too during the tendentious political atmosphere that has arisen as the legacy of the George W. Bush presidency, being environmentally literate quite suspiciously means learning how to turn the other cheek and listen to “both sides” of an issue—even when the issue is the unprecedented mass extinction of life taking place on the planet. In a manner that accords more with Fox News than Greenpeace, a leading environmental literacy pamphlet (Archie, 2003) emphasizes that “Teaching and learning about the environment can bring up controversies that must be handled in a fair and balanced manner in the classroom” (p. 11). Later in the document a teacher from Lincoln High School in Wisconsin is highlighted in order to provide expert advice in a similar fashion: “I’d say the most important aspect of teaching about the environment is to look at all aspects involved with an issue or problem. Teach from an unbiased position no matter how strong your ideas are about the topic. Let the kids make decisions for themselves” (p. 12), she implores. This opinion is mirrored by the Environmental Education Division of the Environmental Protection Agency (a federal office, created by the Bush administration, dedicated to furthering environmental literacy), which on its own website underscores as “Basic Information” that “Environmental education does not advocate a particular viewpoint or course of action. Rather, it is claimed that environmental education teaches individuals how to weigh various sides of an issue through critical thinking and it enhances their own problem-solving and decision-making skills.”10 Yet, this definition was authored by an administration trumping for a wider right-wing movement that attempts to use ideas of “fair and balanced” and “critical thinking” to occlude obvious social and ecological injustices, as well as the advantage it gains in either causing or sustaining them. This same logic defending the universal value of nonpartisan debate has been used for well over a decade by the right to prevent significant action on global warming. Despite overwhelming scientific acceptance of its existence and threat, as well as of its primarily anthropogenic cause, those on the right have routinely trotted out their own pseudo-science on global warming and thereby demanded that more research is necessary to help settle a debate on the issue that only they are interested in continuing to facilitate. Likewise, within academic circles themselves, powerful conservatives like David Horowitz have the support of many in government who are seeking to target progressive scholars and viewpoints on university and college campuses as biased evidence of a leftist conspiracy at work in higher education (Nocella, Best & McLaren, Forthcoming). In order to combat such alleged bias, “academic freedom” is asserted as a goal in which “both sides” of academic issues must be represented in classrooms, departments, and educational events. The result of this form of repressive tolerance (see chapter 5) is simply to impede action on matters worth acting on and to gain further ideological space for right-wing, corporate and other conservative-value agendas.11 It is clear, then, that despite the effects and growth of environmental education over the last few decades, it is a field that is ripe for a radical reconstruction of its literacy agenda. Again, while something like environmental education (conceived broadly) should be commended for the role it has played in helping to articulate many of the dangers and pitfalls that modern life now affords, it is also clear that it has thus far inadequately surmised the larger structural challenges now at hand and has thus tended to intervene in a manner far too facile to demand or necessitate a rupture of the status quo. What has thereby resulted is a sort of crisis of environmental education generally and, as a result, the prevailing trends in the field have recently been widely critiqued by a number of theorists and educators who have sought to highlight their limitations.

### A2 Be Neg

#### Rigged game – we’re not guaranteed a link

#### They’ll still say framework on the aff

#### There’s value in affirmation – every moment is a chance for ethics – being aff is crucial to ethically relating to the resolution

#### They assume that debate is a neutral testing ground – that’s the false objectivity that upholds corporatization and exclusions

#### Being neg doesn’t solve

**Winter 7 -**University of Sheffield, UK (Christine Winter (2007): Knowledge and the curriculum: Derrida,¶ deconstruction and ‘sustainable development’, London Review of Education, 5:1, 69-82)bs

Derrida is interested in the way that Enlightenment ideas steep us in certain ways of thinking that involve understanding knowledge through universalizing concepts based on the¶ notion that the world has a fundamental order to it that pre-exists attempts by humans to¶ understand it. Geographers Cloke, Philo and Sadler make the point well: ¶ … the social sciences have by and large taken on board a natural-scientific notion of order¶ existing ‘out there’ in the ‘real’ world, and have hence embarked upon quest after quest for¶ the ‘true’ order of the human world—for the ‘true’ way in which human agents interact with¶ one another, with their institutions and with other processes, forces, mechanisms and so on¶ … and have usually accepted the natural–scientific view that this order pre-exists any attempt¶ by human agents to conceptualize it. (Cloke et al., 1991, p. 187)¶ This second tenet, frameworks of meaning, involves the imposition of supposedly naturalistic and scientific order to matters that lie outside the realm of science and is known as¶ ‘scientism’. Typically it carries with it a kind of essentialism—the fundamental order of¶ how things really are, which is burdened by a whole metaphysics. In geography this¶ includes the identification of, for example, the use of binary opposites like physical–human¶ geography; economically more developed country–economically less developed country¶ (EMDC–ELDC); renewable–non-renewable energy supplies; society–nature, urban–rural¶ and the framing of human behaviour in models (like push–pull factors), diagrams (like¶ population pyramids), stages (like the demographic transition), patterns (like global population migrations) and processes (like natural population change). Scientism assumes that the¶ world can in principle be known objectively—with certainty and precision—through totalizing and definitive explanations.¶ The crucial point here is not to deny objectivity but to question how we can achieve it¶ objectively through totalizing and definitive explanations. This is not to undermine the need¶ for truth—there are standards that have to be met in geography and everywhere else.¶ There is right and wrong. But many people are not satisfied with an ordinary concept of¶ truth, instead, they search for what Derrida calls a ‘scientificist objectivism’ (1974, p. 61), a¶ metaphysical underwriting of knowledge, which is naturalized and considered to be the¶ ‘Essence of Reality’.¶ Now Derrida does not refute completely such Enlightenment ideas. Instead he wants us¶ to question these frameworks of meaning to find out how they are naturalized and how¶ they operate to authorize and legitimate certain ways of understanding the world. At the¶ same time, he is concerned about the responsibility that totalizing discourses carry in the¶ sense of revealing some aspects of knowledge at the same time as concealing others. 3. Responsibility¶ ‘Deconstruction is justice’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 15). In the case of our geography text,¶ deconstruction sensitizes us to something stirring, possibly amiss or missing, within the¶ assumptions of the fixed meanings of words, universal laws, and the presumptions of¶ scientific method. Derrida’s deconstruction of the Enlightenment commitment to order¶ does not destroy or jettison these ideas but picks them over like a rag picker, to find the¶ 3 Knowledge and the curriculum 75¶ ‘bits and pieces that tend to drop from sight in the prevailing view of things’ (Caputo,¶ 1997, p. 52). The rag picker uses the rags—the unwanted, overlooked remnants of¶ cloth—picking up loose threads to create something new. This is a responsibility to the¶ other that has been omitted, forgotten and left out—it is a more exacting objectivity—¶ because deconstruction is first of all an affirmation of the advent of the other.¶ What is ‘the other’ in the context of geography? On the one hand, it may be other¶ groups of people that have been neglected in the way meaning is fixed in the text or in the¶ way totalizing discourses categorize and organize knowledge. For example, in the textbook chapter, reference to how and why particular communities are affected by problematical environmental conditions is omitted as SD is discussed using generalized, ahistorical,¶ apolitical language. On the other hand, the textbook chapter downplays the affective side¶ of human experience, emphasizing instead (again in general, ahistorical, apolitical and¶ anodyne terms), notions like ‘affluence’ and ‘poverty’. Other ways of knowing, such as the¶ compassionate, spiritual, ethical and political may be overlooked in the way knowledge is¶ configured. I now move to the fourth tenet, transgression, which relates the idea of¶ responsibility to the earlier discussion about ‘what is really happening, is always to come’

### Theory 2AR

#### 2 reasons you should vote affirmative---

#### First, their theory argument is a myth to maintain status quo power structures by insulating the system from the challenge posed to it by the 1AC – the Delgado evidence indicates the myth espoused by the affirmative is key to challenging narratives that maintain repetitive, predictable, and unproductive debates that shore up the continuity of the system.

#### Second, .

## A2 NCs

### Logos Mythos with Dualism

#### Deeply linked with the dualism between nature and culture is the dualism between logos and mythos, or mythical ways of viewing the world. But this desire to know and control the world results in profound anxiety

Loy 95 [“On the Duality of culture and Nature” Philosophica, Vol. 55 (January 1995)] AT

Much of the Western tradition can be understood in terms of increasing self-consciousness about the difference between culture and nature. The problems that anthropology has recently discovered about culture parallel what Buddhism claims about the problem of the individual self. We alternate between the promise of technological progress (freedom through self-grounding) and yearning for a return to nature (security through regrounding). Since both are impossible for us, is there is any third alternative? It is very remarkable that we should be inclined to think of civilization -- houses, trees, cars, etc. -- as separating man from his origins, from what is lofty and eternal, etc. Our civilized environment, along with its trees and plants, strikes us then as though it were cheaply wrapped in cellophane and isolated from everything great, from God, as it were. That is a remarkable picture that intrudes upon us. (Wittgenstein) [1] Wittgenstein's ignorance of the history of philosophy was not always an advantage, yet sometimes it helped him to see what the rest of us tend to see through. Although the epigraph may be taken in different ways, for me it brings into question a distinction so fundamental that it is extremely difficult to think about -- because we almost inevitably find ourselves thinking with it: the dualism between nature and culture. This is a bifurcation which has taken and continues to take many different forms, but which may be traced back to the Greek distinction between phusis and nomos, nature and convention. Was this conceptual antinomy a liberating discovery, because it deprived social and ideological structures of their necessary and 'natural' character, or was it a thought-construction that we today find ourselves constrained by? Or both? Such questions reveal how inescapable the dualism has become for us: even the attempt to understand it becomes expressed in terms of it. Much of the Western tradition can be understood in terms of increasing self-consciousness about the difference between nature and convention/culture, and the dialectic whereby each alternately becomes preferred to the other. Hesiod (8th C. BCE?), who stands not far inside the threshold of literacy, already distinguishes between the traditional agricultural life he praises -- in the Golden Age of the past -- and the technological innovations that Protagoras and Anaxagoras would later praise -- which may lead to a golden age in the future. These temporal orientations became enshrined as part of the fixed pattern: those who yearn for nature evoke the past, while those who privilege culture have high hopes for the future. Then as today, nobody is satisfied with the present. The fifth century brought not only the democratic and imperialistic aspirations of Periclean Athens but also the first plans for reorganizing society along more rational lines. As Democritus expressed it, nature is not simply inborn but may be implanted with education and training. The most enthusiastic proclamation of human ability to control and transform the natural is found in Sophocles' Antigone lines 332-375, although these verses close with the warning -- the first of many since -- that this possibility is a mixed blessing. Like so many other conceptual tensions, that between phusis and nomos was addressed and not quite resolved by Plato: the simpler life of earlier pastoral society was more conducive to goodness and happiness, yet it lacked philosophy (Laws 679e) -- itself a product of the growing alienation between social custom and natural order. The Cynics may be viewed as a radical reaction to this split: in response to the unsatisfactory nomos that their reconstructing Greek society offered, they preferred to live naturally, dog-like (Gr., kunikos). Unfortunately for them, the attraction of such a lifestyle was at the same time its impossibility. Once convention has been recognized as convention, you cannot go home again, for the essential condition of someone truly "close to nature" is that one does not know one is close to nature. The paradox has dogged us ever since. Closer to our time, but no less determined by this dualism, such figures as Diderot, Rousseau, Herder, the Romantics, and later Spengler (to mention only a few) contrasted the organic and genuine with the artificiality and superficiality of conventionality, seeking spontaneity and sincerity in place of sterile rationality. On the other side, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Condorcet and Comte (to mention only a few) expressed almost unbounded optimism in the progressive capacity of human beings to understand and control the laws of their own development. Even closer to home, because still largely determining the ways we think about our own "nature" Freud emphasizes the importance of the socially-constructed ego and superego controlling the anomic urges of libido instinct; Marcuse and Norman Brown celebrate eros unbound. Is the Internet liberatory or alienating? Are humans the rightful stewards of nature, or is it better to "let things be" and allow each species its own intrinsic value? Should economic policy minimize government control of the "free market," or does the marketplace need to be carefully regulated? Should liberal education instill an appreciative awareness of the long and rich tradition that has made us what we are, or should it train us to think critically -- more often than not, to uncover the multifarious ways that tradition disguises itself as natural and inevitable? The tropes shift, and what is culture in one context becomes nature in another, yet consciously or unconsciously we continue to line up on both sides of issues that are none the less important for reconstituting the same fundamental dialectic. Inescapable for us, perhaps, but not universal. In fact, it seems to me that the significance we have come to place upon the duality between phusis and nomos is distinctively Western, because almost uniquely Greek in origin. [2] Historically, the distinction became important due to the sophists, whose privileged position in Greek society allowed for the development of a new transcendental vision radically different from those that arose in other ancient civilizations. In most premodern societies the sociopolitical order is validated by sacralizing it. Rulers are gods or empowered by them; to revolt against secular authority, therefore, is to challenge divine power as well. Occasionally, however, contrary transcendental visions have succeeded in distinguishing a sacred dimension from the political. What social conditions encouraged the development of such alternative perspectives? "Transcendence," whether it takes the form of divine revelation or of theoretical cosmology, implies a search for authority outside the institutionalized offices and structures of the seeker's society. Even its most concrete form, the law code, implies a transfer of authority from the holders of office to the written rule. Transcendental impulses therefore constitute, by definition, an implicit challenge to traditional authority and indicate some dissatisfaction with it... [N]ew transcendental visions are ... likely to be presented by persons in a precariously independent, interstitial -- or at least exposed and somewhat solitary -- position in society; they are therefore particularly likely to occur in societies sufficiently differentiated to have specialized social roles with distinct bases of authority, but not complex enough to have integrated these roles into functionally differentiated structures. [3] This fits the main examples of transcendence that come to mind. In the case of Hebrew monotheism, "interstitial" prophets such as Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah developed the ethical transcendentalism established by the Mosaic covenant; Max Weber drew attention to how their precarious independence was supported by their ability to prophesize in towns and then withdraw into the hills. In the case of India, Louis Dumont has pointed out a two-stage process: Vedic rituals became so complicated that the role of specialist priests became exalted; then later there appeared "a full-fledged and peculiar social role outside society proper: the renouncer, as an individual-outside-the-world, inventor or adept of a 'discipline of salvation' and of its social concomitant, best called the Indian sect." [4] The case of axial-age Greece differs decisively from both the above. Humphreys finds the necessary precondition for a transcendental perspective on society in the privileged and relatively independent position of its intellectuals, especially the sophists, whose special linguistic skills provided "the ability to recreate social relationships and manipulate them in thought." [5] In this instance, however, what Greek intellectuals offered was less a new vision of the divine than a new vision of the secular -- in other words, they discovered or created what became our distinction between the sacred and the secular. Instead of reforming the Homeric pantheon, with its unsatisfactory vision of life and the afterlife, they sought to displace it by distinguishing logos from mythos. Thought liberated itself from myth and superstition, thereby establishing another ambivalent duality whose consequences we still benefit from and struggle against. Or, more precisely, another aspect of the same phusis-nomos dialectic, since nomos and logos both serve to demystify and subordinate what had previously been taken for granted as "natural" Thales founded philosophy when he did not use the gods to explain the world. Solon did not get his new laws from them. Pericles did not even mention them in his funeral oration. Greek drama reduced their role by emphasizing human motivation and responsibility. Socrates cited the gods only to justify a quest for wisdom that did not otherwise depend on them. One does not escape the gods so easily, however. Psychologically they serve a crucial function. We ground ourselves in a mythological worldview because it organizes the cosmos for us: it explains who we are, why we are here, and what our role is in the larger order of things. Even if that vision is in some ways inadequate -- as Homeric religion certainly was -- its disappearance is likely to make things worse, because the liberation of logos also liberates the anxiety of freedom, from the realization that there is no "natural" transcendental order sacralizing our way of life. The psychoanalyst Otto Rank divided our anxiety into two complementary fears. "Whereas the life fear is anxiety at going forward, becoming an individual, the death fear is anxiety at going backward, losing individuality. Between these two fear possibilities the individual is thrown back and forth all his life." [6] This can be expressed just as well in terms of freedom: we feel the need to be free, but becoming free makes us more anxious and therefore more inclined to sacrifice that freedom for security, at which time we again feel a need to be free... In short, our two great needs, freedom and security, conflict. With regard to the relationship between nature and culture, this issue is primarily a problem of meaning: to accept one's culture as natural implies that the meaning of my life is decided for me, while the freedom to discover or construct my own meaning is to embrace a vertigo resulting from the lack of an external -- i.e., a "natural" -- foundation. If this dialectic can also be true for whole societies, it is consistent with what we now know about the "harmonious Greeks" and helps to explain why Athenian democracy collapsed. Since Burckhardt and Nietzsche it has become obvious that the Greeks were not Apollonian but profoundly anxious and troubled, "an unusually energetic, restless, turbulent people, given to excess," who idealized harmony and balance because it was a virtue they rarely achieved. As Thucydides put it, they "were born into the world to take no rest themselves, and to give none to others." [7] The cultural flowering that continues to awe us is easier to appreciate in retrospect. Because it so fundamentally challenged the old ways, such an explosion of creativity was profoundly disturbing to most people at the time. Many progressive thinkers were tried for heresy: Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Socrates, probably Protagoras and Euripides; Plato and Aristotle wisely absented themselves. As Euripides realized, "the gain which has accrued to man from his newly-found independence" is that "he has no firm ground to stand on, and is helplessly exposed to the hazards of life." [8] Unsurprisingly, there was "an undeniable growth of anxiety and dread in the evolution of Greek religion." [9] This anxiety was also projected externally. When Athens became democratic, it became not less but more imperialistic and genocidal, as the Peloponnesian War demonstrates, which is to say that collectively the Athenians' impulses towards greed and domination may actually have been increased by the fact that they had evolved a new mode of self-governance. [10] The fourth century (which began with Socrates' execution) increasingly came to emphasize personal freedom and "self-indulgence" as the integrity of the polis declined in favor of the individual advancement which came to preoccupy those who controlled economic life and many of those who controlled political affairs. Plato's Republic and Laws present a reaction to this: the increasingly jaundiced view of an old man who has observed the development and the failures of personal liberty, for without self-control freedom had become libertinism. Aristotle is almost as critical of the new polities in which he lived, for "in these extreme democracies, each man lives as he likes -- or, as Euripides says, "For any end he chances to desire." [11] The democratic experiment in self-government had not worked to resolve the increased anxiety that the increased individualism of the "democratic personality" generated, for the self-governance of the demos clearly did not entail the self-governance of the self. The consequences of this for Greek thought were profound. Philosophical discourse on freedom took a radically new turn as a critical distinction was made between outer and inner freedom. The Republic makes a momentous analogy between harmony in the state and harmony in the soul. Plato came to conceive of reason as the master with desire and emotion as its slaves. The virtue of freedom was retained by reconceptualizing it in terms of the self-mastery of self-consciousness. In contrast to the incoherent life of the democrat, the psychic tendencies of the spiritually developed individual are harmonized with each other because they are governed by reason. [12] Just as the sophists had realized that the state is nomos, a construction which can be reconstructed, so those after Socrates realized that the psyche is a construction which can be reconstructed, with reason as the master. And the aggravated anxiety that shadowed increased individualism required such psychic reconstruction. Rather than solving the growing problem with civic freedom, however, this aggravated it: like the merchants and politicians who retreated into the more private world of their own self-advancement, those who succeeded Plato retreated from commitment to the polis into the more private world of abstract thought, which for them became the only method by which true freedom might be gained. This encouraged or aggravated a third dualism (or a third aspect to the phusis/nomos, mythos/logos dualism): the split between soma and psyche, body and soul. In becoming more self-conscious, the mind became more aware of itself as other than the body yet nonetheless subject to it, and in particular subject to the same fate. In this way an anxiety for freedom showed itself. "Nature" is from the Latin natus, "born," but what is born also dies. The discovery of the psyche was or soon became an attempt to reach the eternal and incorruptible, to escape the cycle of nature whereby whatever attains form is doomed to decay and death. As Santayana puts it somewhere, repetition is the only form of permanence that nature can achieve. For some cultures this seems to have been enough, but psyche offered (and greater self-consciousness perhaps required) the possibility of personal survival, even as nomos offered the possibility of symbolic survival: the continuation of cultural constructs including one's name and personal influence. The parallel is too suggestive to ignore. Is the duality of nature and culture that of body and soul writ large? Soul and society both seek to escape the physical constraints of the natural world, yet all they can achieve is increasing alienation from that which they are, from the other perspective, manifestations of. The result is that kind of marriage where the couple are not happy together but cannot live apart. The alienated mind uses logos to try to subdue and/or escape its physical ground; civilization uses logos-technology to pursue the same ambivalent goal by transforming the natural world into its own image -- until everything natural is turned into "resources" to be consumed. In both cases the anxiety generated by this alienation generates projects that only increase the alienation (and thus the anxiety). I have gone on at such length about the classical Greek situation because the seeds that sprouted then grew to become trees still luxuriant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That brings us to Christopher Herbert's Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century, [13] which traces the now problematic culture concept back to anthropology's reaction against Christian evangelism. For Wesley and other eighteenth-century evangelists, the doctrine of original sin describes the dangerous state of ungoverned (anomic) desire. According to this version of the nature vs. culture dualism, society is 'in artificial restraint imposed by necessity upon volatile, uncontrollably self-multiplying individual impulses and desires which in a state of unimpaired freedom, could any such state exist, would act without limit.' [14] Herbert claims that the anthropological doctrine of culture (and of 'cultural wholeness' in particular) evolved as a scientific rebuttal of this myth, although a refutation that has never succeeded in fully dispelling it, since in other guises it remains a leading paradigm of modern (usually conservative) social thought. In response, Herbert, following Itard and Pritchard, argues that culture is less a (dualistic) system of controls imposed upon desire than a system of desire. Anomic desire freed from its "cultural script " becomes insane not because it violates prohibitions but because it contradicts and frustrates itself: [T]he function of culture is not to restrain bestial drives, but to consolidate and articulate energies that become garbled and wholly ineffectual when left to find their own track by themselves. By its uncontrollable fragmentation and multiplication of objects, modern desire, desire, that is, conditioned by the post-Rousseauistic cult of personal freedom from conventionality, dooms itself to frustration. [15] Anomie, originally understood as a social condition in which norms have p. 17 On the Duality of culture and Nature Philosophica, Vol. 55 (January 1995) ceased acting effectively as restraining influences, is less a manifestation of unbounded innate desires than a sociological phenomenon created by structural incoherences within a society. All of which is helpful for understanding what happened in fifth and fourth century Greece. Because his argument is confined to the last two hundred years or so, Herbert does not notice that the dualism he addresses is only part of a more fundamental nature/culture dualism which has been constitutive of Western civilization and its burgeoning self-consciousness. The parallel between Greek and Victorian times is rooted in similar declines of belief in religious transcendence -- the Olympian pantheon as much as the Christian God -- which maintained and validated social norms. As we can see more readily (in retrospect) than Plato or Aristotle could, the problem that arose in the fourth century BCE was not a liberation of anomic desire but the collapse of a nomic system of desire previously maintained by the belief that such a system was 'natural,' i.e., created and perpetuated by the gods. When social nomos could no longer be understood as phusis, society destabilized. Having lost their unquestioned belief in such a sacralizing ground, the Greek city-states tried to restructure themselves, as we too continue to try to do, yet self-consciousness of the difference between nature and culture can never recover the unselfconscious groundedness that, for better and worse, has been lost. The freedom that was gained to determine the course of their own lives, collectively and individually, was equaled by a tragic loss of security due to the disappearance of a transcendental ground. From my Buddhist perspective, what is most striking about the above social problem is how much it resembles the central problem for the individual self, which according to Buddhism is the sense-of-self's anxiety due to dimly-intuited awareness that it is not self-existing or "natural" but a mental construct. Classical Greece demonstrates the similar collective anxiety that arose when a society became aware of itself as a construct. In order to develop this parallel, however, it is first necessary to adumbrate the Buddhist approach as I understand it. Central to Buddhist teachings is a denial of the self (an-atman). Contemporary psychology makes such a doctrine seem somewhat less perverse to us today, by providing some homegrown handles on what remains a very counterintuitive claim. I think Buddhism anticipated the reluctant conclusions of psychoanalysis: that guilt and anxiety are not adventitious but intrinsic to the ego. This is because our dissatisfaction p. 18 On the Duality of culture and Nature Philosophica, Vol. 55 (January 1995) with life (duhkha) derives from a repression even more immediate than death-fear: the suspicion that "I" am not real. For Buddhism, the ego is not a self-existing consciousness but a mental construction, a fragile sense-of-self suspecting and dreading its own no-thing-ness. Our problem arises because this conditioned consciousness wants to ground itself -- i.e., to make itself real. If the sense-of-self is a construct, however, it can real-ize itself only by objectifying itself in the world. The ego-self is this never-ending project to objectify oneself in some way, something consciousness can no more do than a hand can grasp itself or an eye see itself. The consequence of this perpetual failure is that the sense-of-self has, as its inescapable shadow, a sense-of-lack, which it always tries to escape. In deconstructive terms, the ineluctable trace of nothingness in our non-self-present being is a feeling of lack. What Freud called" the return of the repressed "in the distorted form of a symptom shows us how to link this basic yet hopeless project with the symbolic ways we try to make ourselves real in the world. We experience this deep sense of lack as the feeling that "there is something wrong with me," yet that feeling manifests, and we respond to it, in many different ways: I'm not rich enough, not published enough, not loved enough, etc. Such anxiety is eager to objectify into fear of something, because we have particular ways to defend ourselves against particular feared things. The problem with objectifications, however, is that no object can ever satisfy if it's not really an object we want.

#### Modernity is founded upon 2 fundamental premises – humanism, which justifies our separation from and destruction of the environment; and rationalism, which removes the mystical from the world – this puts civilization itself in danger

Sale, 90 (Kirkpatrick Sale, BA in History from Cornell, he is an independent scholar and author who has written prolifically about political decentralism, environmentalism, luddism and technology, “The Columbian Legacy and the Ecosterian Response”, New Economics Institute, <http://neweconomy.net/publications/lectures/sale/kirkpatrick/the-columbian-legacy-and-the-ecosterian-response>, rm)

That, in all its glory and all its terror, is the Columbian Legacy. Today, after the five-hundred-year trajectory of their worldwide conquest, we can see it in fullest clarity and ponder what it has brought us to. I have isolated four of its essential characteristics, those that may be said to be the cornerstones of European civilization nascent in the fifteenth century and embedded somewhere in the soul of the Great Discoverer, who spread them across the ocean sea, and that, thanks to him, came to support the edifice we call the Modern Age, indeed modern civilization: 1. Humanism—the declaration and celebration of the human species as the most important species of all (and of men as the most important component of it), with a God-given right to conquer and destroy and manipulate and control in its service, to have "dominion over" the species, the elements, even the processes of the earth. 2. Rationalism—that bipolar, straight-line, reductive way of looking at the world, according to which all is knowable, and knowable by us, finding its apex in that branch of rationalism we call science, which is our method of asserting control over nature and (in Schiller's phrase) "de-godding" its constituent parts. 3. Materialism—the narrow perception and appreciation of the world in terms of the corporal and tangible, and the valuation of it in terms of accumulation and possession, a belief-system that becomes most overt in the economic arrangements known as capitalism, whose genius is to permit virtually no other consideration than the immediate goal of profit to interfere with the exchange of goods. 4. Nationalism—that bold invention by which various self-styled "royal" families forged political institutions that took on the shape of nation-states, becoming over the centuries the central institution in daily life, deposing church, guild, manor, city-state, community, and individual, and creating that by which they were sustained: the standing army and the philosophy of militarism. Those four, then—humanism and its domination, rationalism and its science, materialism and its capitalism, nationalism and its militarism—were the characteristics that made Europe successful, that made Europe powerful, that made Europe Europe. Fueled by the treasure extracted from the New World and working synergistically in a unique and marvelous way, they allowed one small set of people to expand and spread out and ultimately dominate not only the other peoples but the other species of the world as well and to do so unremittingly for five centuries—a dominance of white male over dark, technics over sodality, the mechanical over the organic, and, above all, of human over nature. Those characteristics may all seem natural and inevitable, yet we might remind ourselves that they are not eternal givens but rather constructs, inventions, of a particular time and place and people, and they have had a life of barely more than half a millennium. They also may seem desirable and invaluable—humanism, science, modernity, civilization; how could they be anything but good? But it is well to realize that this is so only because those who believe in them and profit by them declare them to be so, to realize, too, that there is a growing body of people beginning to question their merit and wondering if in fact they are not perhaps the cause of our modern multiple crises. For there is no longer room to doubt that now, five hundred years later, the subcontinent of Europe—and all the continents it has peopled and all the cultures it has touched—represents a society in crisis, a crisis, like the previous one, of spirit as much as of substance. The industrial world, the European-culture world, of which this nation is a preeminent example, is sickly, miserable, melancholic, anguished, increasingly without a faith to believe in, institutions to trust, or values to rely on, victim of the disease I have called "affluenza," the frenzied amassment of packages and products to the point that they choke our lives and clutter our landscapes while at the same time we amass slums, crimes, drugs, prisoners, suicides, debts, diseases, and pollution on a scale without parallel in history—and now stand at the point where not only is the survival of the human animal in real question but the survival of all oxygen-dependent species and indeed the living earth itself. We have as a culture subscribed to the theory of progress—it is time to cancel that subscription. The Columbian Legacy stands before us today as never before—that legacy which we know by the name of European civilization, brought from the Old World to the New by the man who, as Columbia, is the very personification of the United States, the hero and champion of progress—stands before us, I might say,in the dock, affording us a chance, before it is too late, to examine its record and assess its crimes and pass judgment and weigh its future. That above all should be the project of this nation in the next two years as we approach the much-ballyhooed Columbian Quincentennial—a project that I trust you have already begun upon and will, with me, intensify in the months to come. For we really have no choice. Our planet, we now know, is on the endangered species list.

### Ethics

#### We cannot continue to rely on the ethical systems and policy framing of the past, systems that have directly contributed to modern ecocide

Wildlaw 11 [“Submission by Wild Law UK to the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development” Wild Law UK, 27 October 2011] AT

A.3.2 Rio +20 should also address the growing challenge of human-centred governance, and lack of recognition of the rights of nature. Current governance is failing to prevent the cumulative degradation of the natural world. The root cause is disconnection from the Earth and human-centred thinking embedded in laws and sustainable development policies, which even in their most protective environmental form, treat nature as a "resource" for the sole benefit of humanity. A recent example of this is the UK’s Natural Environment White Paper which values nature purely for ‘environmental services’ for the benefit of humans. Laws and policies recognise the rights of fictitious corporations but not the inherent rights of nature, which is alive. As such, protection of nature is often subsumed to the perceived greater “[human] public interest” in economic growth. Such anthropocentrism is out of step with science, and leads to a dangerously unbalanced relationship between humans and the rest of the community of life on Earth.

#### Modern ecocide demands a new ethic of respect for the biosphere – this is most ethically appropriate and fulfills our role in the universe

Rolston 94 [(Holmes, Distinguished Professor, Department of Philosophy Colorado State University) Reflecting on Nature: Readings in Environmental Philosophy. Edited by Gruen, Lori, and Dale Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Contains Rolston, "Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural World," pp. 65--84.]

A shutdown of the life stream is the most destructive event possible. The wrong that humans are doing, or allowing to happen through carelessness, is stopping the historical vitality of life, the flow of natural kinds. Every extinction is an incremental decay in this stopping of life, no small thing. Every extinction is a kind of superkilling. It kills forms (species) beyond individuals. It kills essences beyond existences, the soul as well as the body. It kills collectively, not just distributively. It kills birth as well as death. Afterward nothing of that kind either lives or dies. Ought species x to exist? is a distributive increment in thecollectivequestion, ought life on Earth to exist? Life on Earth cannot exist without its individuals, but a lost individual is always reproducible; a lost species is never reproducible. The answer to the species question is not always the same as the answer to the collective question, but because life on Earth is an aggregate of many species, the two are sufficiently related that the burden of proof lies with those who wish deliberately to extinguish a species and simultaneously to care for life on Earth. One form of life has never endangered so many others. Never before has this level of question—superkilling by a superkiller—been deliberately faced. Humans have more understanding than ever of the natural world they inhabit and¶ ¶ of the speciating processes, more predictive power to foresee the intended and unintended results of their actions, and more power to reverse the undesirable consequences. The duties that such power and vision generate no longer attach simply to individuals or persons but are emerging duties to specific forms of life. What is ethically callous is the maelstrom of killing and insensitivity to forms of life and the sources producing them. What is required is principled responsibility to the biospheric Earth. Human activities seem misfit in the system. Although humans are maximizing their own species interests, and in this respect behaving as does each of the other species, they do not have any adaptive fitness. They are not really fitting into the evolutionary processes of ongoing biological conservation and elaboration. Their cultures are not really dynamically stable in their ecosystems. Such behavior is therefore not right. Yet humanistic ethical systems limp when they try to prescribe right conduct here. They seem misfits in the roles most recently demanded of them.¶ ¶ If, in this world of uncertain moral convictions, it makes any sense to assert that one ought not to kill individuals without justification, it makes more sense to assert that one ought not to superkill the species without superjustification. Several billion years' worth of creative toil, several million species of teeming life, have been handed over to the care of this late-coming species in which mind has flowered and morals have emerged. Ought not this sole moral species do something less self-interested than count all the produce of an evolutionary ecosystem as nothing but human resources? Such an attitude hardly seems biologically informed, much less ethically adequate. It is too provincial for intelligent humanity. Life on Earth is a many-splendored thing; extinction dims its luster. An ethics of respect for life is urgent at the level of species.

### A2 Modernity Good

#### Nope modernity is not immune to collapse

Davis 09 (Wade Davis, Wade Davis is the best-selling author of several books, including The Serpent and the Rainbow, Light at the Edge of the World, One River, and The Clouded Leopard. He is an award-winning anthropologist, ethnobotanist, filmmaker, and photographer, and his writing and photographs have appeared in numerous publications, including the Globe and Mail, Maclean’s, Newsweek, National Geographic, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. He currently holds the post of Explorer in Residence at the National Geographic Society, November 2009, The Massey Lecture Series, The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters in the Modern World, pp. 192-197)

Before she died, anthropologist Margaret Mead spoke of her singular fear that, as we drift toward a more homogenous world, we are laying the foundations of a **blandly amorphous and singularly generic modern culture** that will have no rivals. The entire imagination of humanity, she feared, might be contained within the limits of a **single intellectual and spiritual modality**. Her nightmare was the possibility **that we might wake up one day and not even remember what had been lost**. Ours species has been around for some 200,000 years. The Neolithic Revolution, which gave us agriculture, and with it surplus, hierarchy, specialization, and sedentary life, occurred only ten to twelve thousand years ago. Modern industrial society as we know it is scarcely 300 years old. **This shallow history should not suggest to any of us that we have all the answers for all of the challenges that will confront us as a species in the coming millennia**. The goal is not to freeze people in time. One cannot make a rainforest park of the mind. Cultures are not museum pieces; they are communities of real people with real needs. The question, as Hugh Brody has written, is not the traditional versus the modern, but **the right of free peoples to choose the components of their lives**. The point is not to deny access, but rather to ensure that all peoples are able to benefit from the genius of modernity on their own terms, and without that engagement demanding the death of their ethnicity. It is perhaps useful to reflect on what we mean when we use the term modernity, or the modern world. All cultures are ethnocentric, fiercely loyal to their own interpretations of reality. Indeed, the names of many indigenous societies translate as “the people,” the implication being that every other human is a non-person, a savage from beyond the realm of the civilized. The word barbarian derives from the Greek barbarus, meaning one who babbles. In the ancient world, if you did not speak Greek, you were a barbarian. The Aztec had the same notion. Anyone who could not speak Nahuatl was a non-human. **We too are culturally myopic and often forget that we represent not the absolute wave of history but merely a world view, and that modernity** — **whether you identify it by the monikers westernization, globalization, capitalism, democracy, or free trade** — **is but an expression of our cultural values**. It is not some objective force removed from the constraints of culture. And **it is certainly not the true and only pulse of history**. It is merely a constellation of beliefs, convictions, economic paradigms that represent one way of doing things, of going about the complex process of organizing human activities. Our achievements to be sure have been stunning, our technological innovations dazzling. The development within the last century of a modern, scientific system of medicine alone represents one of the greatest episodes in human endeavour. Sever a limb in a car accident and you won’t want to be taken to an herbalist. But these accomplishments do not make the Western paradigm exceptional or suggest in any way that it has or ought to have a monopoly on the path to the future. An anthropologist from a distant planet landing in the United States would see many wondrous things. But he or she or it would also encounter a culture that reveres marriage, yet allows half of its marriages to end in divorce; that admires its elderly, yet has grandparents living with grandchildren in only 6 percent of its households; that loves its children, yet embraces a slogan — “twenty-four/seven” — that implies total devotion to the workplace at the expense of family. By the age of eighteen, the average American youth has spent two years watching television. One in five Americans is clinically obese and 60 percent are overweight, in part because 20 percent of all meals are consumed in automobiles and a third of children eat fast food every day. The country manufactures 200 million tons of industrial chemicals each year, while its people consume two thirds of the world’s production of antidepressant drugs. The four hundred most prosperous Americans control more wealth than 2.5 billion people in the poorest eighty one nations with whom they share the planet. The nation spends more money on armaments and war than the collective military budgets of its seventeen closest rivals. The state of California spends more money on prisons than on universities. **Technological wizardry is balanced by the embrace of an economic model of production and consumption that compromises the life supports of the planet**. Extreme would be one word for a civilization that contaminates with its waste the air, water, and soil; that drives plants and animals to extinction on a scale not seen on earth since the disappearance of the dinosaurs; that dams the rivers, tears down the ancient forests, empties the seas of fish, and does little to curtail industrial processes that threaten to transform the chemistry and physics of the atmosphere. Our way of life, inspired in so many ways, **is not the paragon of humanity’s potential**. Once we look through the anthropological lens and see, perhaps for the first time, that all cultures have unique attributes that reflect choices made over generations, **it becomes absolutely clear that there is no universal progression in the lives and destiny of human beings**. Were societies to be ranked on the basis of technological prowess, the Western scientific experiment, radiant and brilliant, would no doubt come out on top. But if the criteria of excellence shifted, for example to the capacity to thrive in a truly sustainable manner, with a true reverence and appreciation for the earth, the Western paradigm would fail. If the imperatives driving the highest aspirations of our species were to be the power of faith, the reach of spiritual intuition, the philosophical generosity to recognize the varieties of religious longing, then our dogmatic conclusions would again be found wanting. When we project modernity, as we define it, as the inevitable destiny of all human societies, we are being disingenuous in the extreme. Indeed, **the Western model of development has failed in so many places in good measure because it has been based on the false promise that people who follow its prescriptive dictates will in time achieve the material prosperity enjoyed by a handful of nations of the West**. Even were this possible, it is not at all clear that it would be desirable. To raise consumption of energy and materials throughout the world to Western levels, given current population projections, would require the resources of **four planet Earths** by the year 2100. To do so with the one world we have would imply so severely compromising the biosphere that the earth would be unrecognizable. Given the values that drive most decisions in the international community, this is not about to happen. In reality, **development for the vast majority of the peoples of the world has been a process in which the individual is torn from [their] ~~his~~ past, propelled into an uncertain future, only to secure a place on the bottom rung of an economic ladder that goes nowhere.**

### A2 NCs

#### Ethical systems must be contextually dependent which means our challenge find an ethics that tackles the problem of ecocide

Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2—Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning AND Department of Town and Regional Planning (Bent Flyvbjerg and Tim Richardson, “Planning and Foucault In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory” <http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf>)

Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. Foucault’s norms are not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993, 316) and in this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, 46). Foucault here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. For Foucault praxis and freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. Whereas Habermas emphasises procedural macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality – having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination. It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison...are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and he directly distances himself from the kinds of universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are themselves part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out only in order to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth—a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power. And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus.

## Other cuts

#### THE EIGHT PRINCIPLES OF UNCIVILISATION

‘We must unhumanise our views a little, and become confident

As the rock and ocean that we were made from.’

We live in a time of social, economic and ecological unravelling. All around us are signs that our whole way of living is already passing into history. We will face this reality honestly and learn how to live with it.

We reject the faith which holds that the converging crises of our times can be reduced to a set of ‘problems’ in need of technological or political ‘solutions’.

We believe that the roots of these crises lie in the stories we have been telling ourselves. We intend to challenge the stories which underpin our civilisation: the myth of progress, the myth of human centrality, and the myth of our separation from ‘nature’. These myths are more dangerous for the fact that we have forgotten they are myths.

We will reassert the role of storytelling as more than mere entertainment. It is through stories that we weave reality.

Humans are not the point and purpose of the planet. Our art will begin with the attempt to step outside the human bubble. By careful attention, we will reengage with the non-human world.

We will celebrate writing and art which is grounded in a sense of place and of time. Our literature has been dominated for too long by those who inhabit the cosmopolitan citadels.

We will not lose ourselves in the elaboration of theories or ideologies. Our words will be elemental. We write with dirt under our fingernails.

The end of the world as we know it is not the end of the world full stop. Together, we will find the hope beyond hope, the paths which lead to the unknown world ahead of us.